OTIS LAMAR BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Brown was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after police stopped his vehicle and discovered drugs. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that although the officer may have had subjective pretextual motives, there was a valid objective basis for the traffic stop based on the driver's erratic driving behavior.
The court held that although the officer may have had subjective pretextual motives for the stop, there was a valid objective basis for it based on the observed erratic driving behavior. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and there was sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.
[1] A traffic stop is valid if there is an objective basis for believing that a driver is impaired by sleepiness or alcohol, even if no specific traffic violation occurred.
[2] The subjective, pretextual motives of an officer for initiating a traffic stop do not invalidate the stop if there is a valid, objective basis for the stop.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, there may be justification for the stopping of a vehicle by a patrolman to determine the reason for its unusual operation.”
Establishes the legal principle that unusual driving behavior alone can justify a traffic stop even without a technical traffic violation, based on public safety concerns.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer observed Brown's car weaving continuously within its own lane and repeatedly slowing to 45 mph then accelerating to 55 mph. The offic…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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LEHAN, Judge.
We affirm defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We cannot conclude that the trial court had no proper basis to deny defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine which was found in defendant’s car upon a search following its stop. The motion asserts that the stop was pretextual.
As defendant argues, there is ample basis to conclude that the officer had subjective, pretextual motives for the stop based upon vague suspicions that the car may have been used for the transportation of drugs. However, we cannot conclude that the trial court had no proper grounds for finding that there was a valid, objective basis for the stop.
According to the officer, the car had been “weaving continuously within its own lane not travelling outside of either the lane mark or inside of the solid line to the outside, but just continued within its own lane” and had slowed to 45 miles per hour and then accelerated to 55 miles per hour on several occasions. “He was really driving erratically.” See Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (“While there was evidence indicating invalid subjective pretextual motives of the officers, there was also evidence of valid objective bases for the stop.”).
It is true that apparently no traffic offense was involved. However, the absence of such an offense does not establish the absence of a valid objective basis for the stop. Testimony before the trial judge was that the officer had observed similar behavior of automobiles many times in the past and was aware that such behavior often indicated sleepy or alcohol-impaired drivers. He testified that he decided to stop the car to ensure that the driver was not impaired by lack of sleep or under the influence of alcohol or drugs and that he had in the past stopped “probably in the dozens” of cars on that basis. See Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla.1975); State v. Frederick, 525 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Our thoughts in this regard are reflected in Bailey where the Florida Supreme Court said, Because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, there may be justification for the stopping of a vehicle by a patrolman to determine the reason for its unusual operation. In this instance, although no vehicular regulation was being violated, it seemed strange to the officer that the vehicle was proceeding at only 45 miles per hour and was weaving, although not so much as to move out of its lane on one side or the other. 319 So. 2d at 26.
Accordingly, we cannot hold that there was error in the trial court’s implicit conclusion that “a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.” Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.1988).
We find no merit in defendant’s additional argument that after the stop there was insufficient probable cause to search defendant’s car. Affirmed.
RYDER, Acting C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…cessary to stop her for a traffic infraction. However, in the absence of a traffic offense, an officer’s suspicion that another crime is being committed, such as DUI, can provide the necessary founded suspicion to support a stop. See Brown v. State, 595 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (finding that the absence of a traffic offense does not establish the absence of a valid objective basis for the stop); State v. Carillo[Carrillo], 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (“an officer can stop a driver based upon a fou…
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Hal A. Davis, Jr. v. State, 606 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…state that the policy was to charge those who drove on the beach with trespass. He testified only that he would have stopped appellant’s vehicle to advise appellant not to drive on the beach in the future. Moreover, as instructed by Brown v. State, 595 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), we know that the commission of a crime or traffic infraction is not a prerequisite to the determination of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent the additional invalid reason. Secondly, Deputy Fairclo…
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Shively v. State, 61 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…mine reason for driver’s “unusual operation” of vehicle at slow speed and weaving within lane, even where court stated that no circumstances reasonably would have led the officer to believe criminal activity was taking place); accord Brown v. State, 595 So. 2d 270, 270-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Mr. Shively’s failure to place the parking token in the slot after several attempts and resulting inability to exit the garage was “unusual” enough to prompt the garage employee to ask the officer for help. The officer’s…
Authorities Cited
- Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- State v. Frederick, 525 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- In re Est. OF John A. Scholtz, 525 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)