BIRD LAKES DEVELOPMENT CORP., APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHEN L. RASKIN, APPELLEE
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Bird Lakes Development Corporation appealed a trial court award of attorney's fees to Stephen L. Raskin, an escrow agent and attorney in a real estate transaction. The court affirmed the award, holding that Raskin was entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under the escrow clause of the contract because he was sued for his actions as escrow agent and was the prevailing party.
Raskin was entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under the escrow clause of the contract. Although Raskin was not entitled to fees under the general prevailing party clause (because he was not a buyer or seller), he was entitled to fees under the specific escrow agent clause because he was sued for his actions as escrow agent and was the prevailing party in the action.
[1] An escrow agent is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under an escrow clause when sued for actions taken in that capacity and prevails in the action.
[2] A party not a buyer or seller under a contract is not entitled to attorney's fees under a general contract provision for prevailing parties in litigation arising out of t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the event of any suit between [b]uyer and [s]eller wherein the escrow agent is made a party by virtue of acting as such escrow agent hereunder ..., the escrow agent shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee and costs incurred, said fees and costs to be charged and assessed as court costs in favor of the prevailing party.”
The specific escrow agent clause of the contract that entitled Raskin to recover attorney's fees as the prevailing party in the third-party action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBird Lakes contracted to sell 35 acres of undeveloped land to Homero Meruelo. Raskin served as both escrow agent and attorney for the buyer, and depos…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the third-party plaintiff Bird Lakes Development Corporation [Bird Lakes] from a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees to the third-party defendant Stephen L. Raskin. We affirm.
Bird Lakes, as seller, entered into a contract to sell thirty-five acres of undeveloped land to Homero Meruelo, as buyer. Raskin served as the escrow agent in this transaction and in that capacity received and deposited in escrow the buyer Merue-lo’s initial deposit of $50,000; Raskin also represented Meruelo as an attorney in this transaction. Subsequently, the parties had a falling out and Meruelo sued Bird Lakes tor fraud and breach of contract. Bird Lakes, in turn, sued Raskin in a third-party complaint claiming that Raskin had breached his contractual and fiduciary obligations as escrow agent by failing to deposit into escrow the sum of $197,000 as an “additional deposit”. Bird Lakes later voluntarily dismissed this third-party claim, and the trial court awarded Raskin attorney’s fees for defending this action.
We agree with Bird Lakes that Ras-kin was not entitled to attorney’s fees under a provision in the contract providing “[i]n connection with any litigation including appellate proceedings arising out of this [c]ontract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (R.135). This is so because Raskin was not a buyer or seller under the contract, and was therefore not a party to the above-stated attorney’s fee clause; indeed, this result is compelled by our recent decision in Baldona v. Security Realty Investment, Inc., 581 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), based on virtually identical facts.
Nonetheless we agree with Raskin that, as escrow agent, he was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees under the escrow clause of the contract which provides: “In the event of any suit between [b]uyer and [s]eller wherein the escrow agent is made a party by virtue of acting as such escrow agent hereunder ..., the escrow agent shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs incurred, said fees and costs to be charged and assessed as court costs in favor of the prevailing party.” Contrary to Bird Lakes’ argument, (1) Raskin was clearly sued below for his actions as escrow agent in allegedly failing to deposit into escrow a certain sum of money, and (2) Raskin was the “prevailing party” under the contract in this third-party action. Because the trial court may be upheld for any reason appearing in the record and the attorney’s fee award to Raskin is clearly sustainable under the escrow clause of the contract,1 see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979); Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So. 2d 222, 225 (Fla.1962), the order under review is, in all respects,
Affirmed.
. It should be noted that the issue of whether the escrow agent attorney's fee clause is applicable herein has been fully briefed on appeal. In this connection, Bird Lakes makes no conten tion that the subject clause is unenforceable as lacking in mutuality in that the party suing the escrow agent would arguably not be entitled to attorney’s fees even if he were the prevailing party. To the contrary, mutuality is read into such a contractual clause as to contracts entered into after October 1, 1988, § 57.105(2), Fla.Stat. (1989); ns to a contract, as here, entered into prior to October 1, 1988, a unilateral attorney’s fee clause is plainly valid and, indeed, mutuality may not be read into such a clause. Petrulli v. Castellano, 412 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Of course, if, unlike this case, the escrow agent had been sued solely as a stakeholder with no allegations of wrongdoing, the escrow agent would automatically be entitled to attorney’s fees under another provision of the contract and could not be required to pay attorney’s fees under the escrow agent attorney’s fee clause.
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Tagge Franzen v. Lacuna Golf Ltd. P'ship, 717 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…rs, Inc. and Doug Ford Golf Shops, Inc. were not signatories or parties to the Agreement or the Declaration. Therefore, they are not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Declaration’s prevailing party provision. See Bird Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Raskin, 596 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Baldoria v. Security Realty Inv., Inc., 581 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1991). Likewise, the individual appellees are not entitled to fees under the contract because they were not parties…
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Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 661 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…v. Barnett Bank, 377 So. 2d 1150,1152 (Fla.1979) (“Even when based on erroneous reasoning, a conclusion or decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports it.”); Bird Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Raskin, 596 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (trial court may be upheld for any reason appearing in the record). [*1237] In sum, we reverse on the cross-appeal, and remand this case to the trial court with directions to enter a directed verdict for Safeco. As to the remainin…
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First States Invs. 3300, LLC v. Pheil, 52 So. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…date, First States is not entitled to recover prevailing party attorneys’ fees based on the contracts and section 57.105(7). See Commercial Serv. of Perry, Inc. v. Campbell, 861 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Bird Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Raskin, 596 So. 2d 133, 135 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (both recognizing that unilateral attorneys’ fees provisions in contracts predating amendment to section 57.105 were valid and enforceable). Regarding First States’ request for costs, First States has sought relief in t…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1962)
- Baldoria v. Sec. Realty Inv., Inc., 581 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Margolis v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 412 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)