ANDRE HENRY, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1992-03-26
No. 77790
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur., OVERTON, J., dissenting with an opinion.
596 So. 2d 661 Florida Supreme Court (1992) Caution
Cited by 44 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We review Henry v. State, 576 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), based on conflict jurisdiction.1

Henry was convicted of armed robbery while carrying a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, and sentenced as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084(4)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1989), to life imprisonment. Henry seeks review claiming that first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment are not subject to the provisions of the habitual offender statute.

We decided that issue contrary to Henry’s position in Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992). However, we also held in Burdick that sentencing under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory.

In this case, the State argued at sentencing that a life sentence is mandatory under section 775.084(4)(a)(l). In sentencing Henry, the trial court indicated that it did not have discretion to decline to impose a life sentence.

Accordingly, we approve the opinion below but remand for the trial court to reconsider Henry’s sentence in light of our determination in Burdick that sentencing under the habitual offender statute is discretionary.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., dissenting with an opinion.

. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Dissent
OVERTON, Justice,

OVERTON, Justice,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), the life sentence for this habitual offender is mandatory.


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  • Henderson v. Dep't of Health, 954 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
    …essing the weight of the evidence or resolving disputed issues of fact. See § 120.68(10), Fla. Stat. (2005). Finally, Ms. Henderson submits that her punishment was “cruel and unusual.” In Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission v. Bradley, 596 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla.1992), the court recognized that a primary function of professional disciplinary boards is to determine the appropriate punishment for misconduct of the professionals regulated. In the [*82] instant ease, it was determined that Ms. Henders…
  • Roberts v. Dep't OF Corr., 690 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …spension DOC proposed as punishment. Since Ms. Roberts took no exception to any of the findings of fact, DOC argues, resort to a transcript was unnecessary. DOC also purports to rely on Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission v. Bradley, 596 So. 2d 661 (Fla.1992), but the Bradley court did not address the question whether an agency head must review a transcript before declining to impose a recommended penalty. The Bradley opinion does not indicate whether the agency head had reviewed a transcript…
  • Boulton v. Morgan, 643 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
    …may adopt in toto the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, yet reject the recommended penalty. But in doing so, the agency must comply with the provisions of section 120.57(l)(b)(10). See Criminal Justice Standards v. Bradley, 596 So. 2d 661 (Fla.1992). In the present case, the school board’s attempt to satisfy the requirements of section 120.57(l)(b)(10) fails because its reasons for varying from the hearing officer’s recommended penalty is grounded on factual predicates not found by…

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