Z.R., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., RESPONDENT; L.E.W., A CHILD, PETITIONER, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., RESPONDENT
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Two juveniles petitioned for habeas corpus relief after being held in detention for more than twenty-one days without an adjudicatory hearing, in violation of Florida law. Although the juveniles subsequently received their hearings, the court addressed the merits as a matter capable of repetition yet evading review, establishing that a juvenile held in detention beyond twenty-one days without court-ordered continuances is entitled to immediate release unless new charges have been filed.
A juvenile held in detention for more than twenty-one days during which no continuances have been granted is entitled to immediate release unless new charges have been filed against the child in the interim. The trial court was without jurisdiction to extend the original detention in these cases because no continuance had been granted and no new charges were filed.
[1] A juvenile held in detention for more than twenty-one days without an adjudicatory hearing is entitled to release unless new grounds for detention have been charged.
[2] A court cannot extend a juvenile's detention beyond twenty-one days without an adjudicatory hearing absent a continuance granted for cause.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No child shall be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than twenty-one days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced by the court.”
States the statutory requirement that triggers the right to release from detention
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceZ.R. and L.E.W., both juveniles, were held in secure detention for more than twenty-one days without an adjudicatory hearing being commenced. When the…
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PER CURIAM.
The juveniles in these two cases were held in detention more than twenty-one days without an adjudicatory hearing in violation of section 39.044(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). Their motions for release were nonetheless denied by the trial court which instead extended the detention. Both juveniles then sought habeas corpus relief from this court.
As is common in such cases where the time spans involved are of such short duration, the state’s responses to the petitions indicate that the juveniles have now received their adjudicatory hearings and therefore it is argued that the petitions should be denied as moot. However, as the issue raised is one which is capable of repetition yet evading review,1 we choose to consider the merits.
Section 39.044(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that “No child shall be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than twenty-one days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced by the court.” The state does not contest that the juveniles in these cases had been held in detention for more than twenty-one days, but argues that after the twenty-one day period had lapsed and the motions for release filed, the court extended the detention for good cause because the trial judge was ill. It is true that section 39.044(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that the twenty-one days of allowable detention shall not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on the motion of the child, his counsel or the state. However, no such motion was made nor any continuance granted during the twenty-one days the juveniles were held in detention, so that provision does not apply. Since the twenty-one days the children were held in detention in these cases did not include any delay due to a court ordered continuance, the juveniles were entitled to be released from detention.
In T.W.C. v. Pate, 369 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the First District agreed that a child held in detention more than twenty-one days without a detention hearing was entitled to release, unless there were new grounds for detention which had been charged in accordance with Chapter 39. Absent such new charges, the First District held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to extend the original detention. See also P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
In accord, we hold that a juvenile held in detention for more than twenty-one days during which no continuances have been granted is entitled to immediate release unless there have been new charges filed against the child in the interim. Nonetheless, because the juveniles in both of these cases have received their adjudicatory hearings and are no longer held within the scope of section 39.044(5)(b), we decline to issue the writs of habeas corpus in these cases.
COBB, PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. . See, e.g., Kight v. State, 574 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.1990); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.1989); In re Interest of M.C., 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Times Publishing Co., Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. Sturgis, 388 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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T.L.W. v. The Honorable A.C. Soud, Jr., 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…hat the reasons given are adequate and supported by the record. III. It appears well-settled that habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a minor held in secure detention contrary to statute. A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla.1992); Z.R. v. State, 596 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); A.O. v. Chinault, 571 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Section 39.044(5)(a) purports to characterize an order of this nature as a final order reviewable by appeal. However, such an order is clearly not final as it does not signal a…
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S.J. v. State, 596 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…TERSON, JJ., concur. . It appears that J.F. entered guilty pleas subsequent to the filing of his petition and as to him, the issue of illegal detention is moot. Nevertheless, we elect to address the issues raised in his petition. Cf. Z.R. v. State, 596 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); W.N. v. Fryer, 572 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).…
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M.D.E. v. State, 206 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…itled to relief. “[A] juvenile held in detention for more than twenty-one days during which no continuances have been granted is entitled to immediate release unless there have been new charges filed against the child in the interim.” Z.R. v. State, 596 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); see also J.S. v. State, 182 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Petitioner is entitled to be released by 5:00 p.m. today. Accordingly, we grant the petition for habeas corpus and order Petitioner’s release by 5:00 p.m. today.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989)
- Kight v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990)
- Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. The Honorable Wallace E. Sturgis, 388 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Times Publ'g Co., Inc. v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- T. W. C. v. Pate, 369 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- In the Interest of M.C., 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)