DARRIN O'NEILL MCCLAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1992-04-08
No. 91-1469
SMITH and MINER, JJ., concur.
596 So. 2d 800 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Darrin O'Neill McClain appeals his conviction for two counts of robbery with a weapon, challenging the trial court's application of State v. Neil to strike defense peremptory challenges. The court affirms the trial court's acceptance of the state's race-neutral reasons for striking a black juror but reverses because the trial court improperly applied Neil to scrutinize the defense's strikes of white jurors without adequate factual basis.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the state's reasons for striking the black juror were race-neutral, as the defense did not meet its burden of showing abuse of discretion. However, the court reversed because the trial court improperly instituted a Neil inquiry into the defense's peremptory strikes without a demonstrated showing that challenged jurors were members of a distinct racial group and that a strong likelihood existed they were challenged solely because of race.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in accepting the state's race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge when the defense fails to meet its burden…

[2] A trial court may not sua sponte institute a Neil inquiry into the defense's exercise of peremptory challenges without a prior demonstration on the record that the challe…

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Key Quotes

“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”

Establishes the threshold requirements for instituting a Neil inquiry and the presumption of nondiscriminatory exercise of peremptories.

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Facts & Procedural History

After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery with a weapon. During voir dire, the state exercised a peremptory challenge to st…

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Opinion of the Court
WIGGINTON, Judge.

[*801] WIGGINTON, Judge.

Appellant appeals his conviction, after jury trial, of two counts of robbery with a weapon. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for a new trial.

Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred in accepting as race neutral the state’s reasons for exercising one of its peremptory challenges to strike a black juror, following defense counsel’s objection to that strike under the authority of State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984). We affirm on that point, having concluded that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that the trial judge abused his broad discretion in this matter. See Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Appellant also challenges the trial court’s denial of attempts by the defense to exercise peremptory challenges to strike white prospective jurors. During voir dire, after the trial judge had conducted the Neil inquiry into the state’s striking of the black juror, the trial judge noted on the record that the defense had peremptorily stricken six white jurors. Thereupon, without further elaboration, sua sponte he called upon defense counsel to state his reasons for each of those strikes and ultimately disallowed four of the strikes on the ground that they were not race neutral. Comments made by the defense counsel indicate that only two non-whites were on the jury panel.

Appellant argues merely that the trial court erred in disallowing the defense’s peremptory strikes because Neil does not apply to white prospective jurors as it does to blacks since whites are not members of a minority race. That argument has been rejected by this court in its recent decision in Elliott v. State, 591 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

However, we note that the “initial presumption is that peremptories will be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner.” Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486. A Neil inquiry shall be instituted only upon a demonstration on the record that the challenged jurors are members of a distinct racial group and that a strong likelihood exists that they have been challenged solely because of their race. In the absence of that demonstration and a corresponding finding by the trial judge of a substantial likelihood of racial discrimination, “no inquiry may be made of the person exercising the questioned peremptories.” Id. Further, as recognized in Elliott, when peremptory challenges are being used to strike members of the majority race, a heavy burden to establish invidious racial motivation accompanies any attempt to deny, pursuant to Neil, the striking party’s right to exercise its peremptory challenges.

In the instant case, our scrutiny of the record reveals no apparent basis for the trial judge’s sua sponte institution of the initial Neil inquiry into the defense’s exercise of the six peremptory challenges. Therefore, we must conclude that the defense was improperly denied, under the guise of Neil, its right to exercise peremptory challenges in a presumptively nondiscriminatory manner. Consequently, this cause is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

SMITH and MINER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Darrin O'Neill McCLAIN, 614 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1993)
    …PER CURIAM. We originally accepted for review McClain v. State, 596 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA1992), based upon conflict jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. After further consideration, we have determined that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this caus…
  • Betancourt v. State, 650 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …a. 1st DCA 1993) (same, challenge based on black juror being victim of robbery); Wimberly v. State, 599 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (same, challenge based on occupation of Hispanic juror being similar to police officer); see also McClain v. State, 596 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (same, trial judge’s own objection to challenge of white prospective jurors), dismissed, 614 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1993); Washington v. State, —So. 2d—[1994 WL 684008] (Fla.1994) (upholding state’s peremptory challenge of African-Ameri…
  • Jairo Josue Melendez v. State, 787 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …hallenges directed to [*920] members of the majority race, the objecting party must carry a heavier-than-normal burden to establish invidious racial discrimination. See Rome v. State, 627 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). See also McClain v. State, 596 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Elliott v. State, 591 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We do not believe that the analysis in Melbourne requires the higher threshold for “the majority race” set by the First District. Instead, we hold that whites const…

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