TERRENCE NELSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Terrence Nelson appeals his sentence for armed robbery, claiming the trial court erred in denying his motion for specific performance of an initial plea agreement. The appellate court agrees and reverses, holding that Nelson was entitled to enforce the original plea agreement after he fulfilled his obligations and the state improperly withdrew the offer based on information it should have discovered beforehand.
The trial court erred in denying the motion for specific performance. The original plea agreement should have been reinstated because Nelson was irrevocably prejudiced by the state's withdrawal after he had fulfilled his cooperation obligations, and the state's withdrawal was based on its own failure to investigate Nelson's prior convictions rather than any misrepresentation by Nelson.
[1] A defendant is entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement when the defendant has fulfilled their obligations under the agreement and the state withdraws the off…
[2] A trial court errs in denying a motion for specific performance of a plea agreement when the defendant has detrimentally relied on the agreement by fulfilling their oblig…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nelson was clearly irrevocably prejudiced by the state's withdrawal of the original plea agreement after he had fulfilled his part of it and left himself nothing with which to bargain.”
Establishes the core unfairness that warrants enforcement of the original plea agreement—Nelson performed his obligations but lost all negotiating power when the state withdrew.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 13, 1990, Nelson entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to robbery with a firearm in exchange for a 7-9 year sentence with a three-year man…
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HALL, Acting Chief Judge.
Terrence Nelson appeals his sentence for his conviction of armed robbery. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for specific performance of his initial plea agreement. We agree.1
On March 13, 1990, Nelson entered into a plea agreement with the state whereby he agreed to plead guilty to robbery with a firearm in case no. 90-663 in exchange for a guidelines sentence of from seven to nine years’ imprisonment, with a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for the armed robbery count in case no. 89-19492. This sentence was to be imposed after Nelson completed his cooperation with law enforcement. The agreement provided the state would withdraw it in the event Nelson failed to cooperate.
Nelson cooperated with law enforcement by providing them enough information to file charges against his codefendant. A plea hearing was held and, after determining Nelson understood the terms of the plea agreement and there was a factual basis for the charges, the trial court accepted Nelson’s plea. Soon thereafter, however, the state informed Nelson it had decided to withdraw the plea offer in light of Nelson’s numerous felony convictions of which it had been previously unaware. In response, Nelson filed his motion for specific performance, which was heard and denied. Nelson subsequently entered into another plea agreement in case nos. 90-663 and 89-19492 whereby he pled guilty in exchange for a sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment, with a three-year minimum mandatory, and a consecutive term of five years’ probation.
We agree that Nelson’s motion for specific performance of his original plea agreement should have been granted. The state makes no allegation that Nelson misrepresented his record. Rather, it appears the state just did not do its homework before making the plea offer. Nelson was clearly irrevocably prejudiced by the state’s withdrawal of the original plea agreement after he had fulfilled his part of it and left himself nothing with which to bargain. See Charatz v. State, 577 So. 2d 1298 (Fla.1991).
Accordingly, we reverse Nelson’s sentence and remand with directions that the original plea agreement be reinstated.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . We find that defense counsel sufficiently preserved this issue for our review at the June 15, 1990, proceeding.