IVORY FAIRWEATHER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Fairweather appealed a trial court order setting restitution at $1500 as a condition of his probation for failure to return a rental car. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a trial court has jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution at any time after imposing restitution as an initial condition of probation, distinguishing the case from State v. Martin where restitution itself had been reserved for future imposition.
The trial court had jurisdiction to set the amount of restitution on appeal date. The distinction between imposing restitution as a condition of probation (done initially) and determining its amount (done later) allows the court to set the amount at any time, as the statute does not specify when the amount must be determined.
[1] A trial court may reserve jurisdiction to set the amount of restitution as a condition of probation, even if the initial probation order does not specify the amount.
[2] A court does not abuse its discretion by leaving the determination of the amount of restitution to a future date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the failure to impose restitution does not result in an illegal sentence [subject to correction at any time], only an incomplete sentence which is subject to modification ... within 60 days.”
Establishes the distinction between imposing restitution and determining its amount, showing that only incomplete sentences are subject to the 60-day modification rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFairweather pleaded nolo contendere to failure to return a rental car and received 18 months probation on March 20, 1990. The probation order imposed …
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JOANOS, Chief Judge.
Ivory Fairweather has appealed from an order setting the amount of restitution to be paid as a condition of his probation. We affirm.
Fairweather plead nolo contendere to the offense of failure to return a rental car, and received 18-months probation. The probation order, entered March 20, 1990, imposed restitution as a condition of probation, but the court reserved jurisdiction to set the amount. One year later, on March 18, 1991, the trial court modified Fair-weather’s probation to set the amount of restitution at $1500.
Fairweather moved for rehearing, based on State v. Martin, 577 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In Martin, the trial court placed the appellant on probation on November 14, 1989, and reserved jurisdiction to impose restitution as a condition of that probation. Eight months later, the court entered its order imposing restitution and setting the amount thereof. However, the court later granted the defendant’s motion to strike restitution, agreeing that it was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence in that more than sixty days had passed since its imposition. See Rule 3.800(b), Fla. R.Crim.P. (a court may modify a legal sentence imposed by it within 60 days of such imposition).
The state appealed, and the appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that the order was not appealable by the state. This court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. However, in the course of a brief opinion ruling on the motion, this court approved the trial court’s determination that it was without jurisdiction to enter the restitution order. It noted that “the failure to impose restitution does not result in an illegal sentence [subject to correction at any time], only an incomplete sentence which is subject to modification ... within 60 days.” Martin at 690 (citations omitted). Fairweather relies on this language to argue that, because the trial court herein set the amount of restitution more than 60 days after entry of the probation order, it was without jurisdiction to do so. We disagree.
In Martin, the trial court reserved jurisdiction, not merely to set the amount of restitution, but to impose restitution as a condition of probation. In the instant case, the trial court imposed restitution as a condition of probation at the time it entered the original March 20, 1990 probation order. It reserved jurisdiction only as to the amount of restitution to be paid. Section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1989) does not specify when the court must determine the amount of restitution, which is a procedural matter within its discretion. McCaskill v. State, 520 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). A court does not abuse its discretion in leaving determination of the amount of restitution to a future date. Weckerle v. State, 579 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the appealed order and affirm.
MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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King v. State, 611 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…edure. The state counters that the colloquy quoted above can fairly be read, not as a reservation of jurisdiction to impose restitution, but rather only to determine the amount thereof, permissible outside the 60-day limit. See Fairweather v. State, 596 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA1992). The state also notes that King did not raise the expired time limit at the March 1992 restitution hearing, and therefore did not preserve the issue for our review. Addressing the last argument first, we note that the Martin cour…
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T.W.L. v. State, 684 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…), where the restitution order was affirmed in light of evidence that the commitment order stated, “Restitution is to be made,” and the transcript of the disposition hearing demonstrated A.P.’s agreement to pay restitution. See Fairweather v. State, 596 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (trial court had jurisdiction to impose restitution as condition of probation and to reserve jurisdiction to set the amount thereof one year later). Absent an adequate showing, on the record, of the trial court’s ordering or impo…
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Campbell v. State, 614 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ne the amount of restitution, provided restitution was imposed at sentencing or within the sixty-day modification period set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). King v. State, 611 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA1992); Fairweather v. State, 596 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA1992); Smith v. State, 589 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA1991). The underlying rationale for the principle is that the initial failure to impose restitution does not render the sentence illegal, hence subject to correction at any time. Rather…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCASKILL v. State, 520 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- State v. Martin, 577 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Weckerle v. State, 579 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)