AMOS C. TESTON AND MATTIE BRIDGES, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed the convictions of Amos C. Teston and Mattie Bridges for unlawful cohabitation, holding that the information filed against them was fatally defective for failing to allege essential elements of the offense with sufficient certainty.
The Court held that the information was fatally defective because it failed to allege that the defendants were not married to each other (creating ambiguity about whether Mattie Bridges was the lawful wife of Teston) and, alternatively, failed to allege that they lived in an open state of adultery as required by the applicable statute. The motions to quash should have been granted.
“we are of the opinion that it is fatally defective in that, for aught that appears therein to the contrary, the defendant, Mattie Bridges, was the lawful wife of the other defendant, Amos C. Teston”
Court's holding that the information failed to clearly allege an essential element—that the defendants were not married to each other
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAmos C. Teston and Mattie Bridges were tried and convicted upon an information charging that they lived and cohabited as husband and wife, with Teston…
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Shackleford, C. J.
Amos C. Teston and Mattie Bridges were tried and convicted upon an information charging that they “did then and there live and continue to cohabit with one another as husband and wife, and he, the said Amos C. Teston, did then and there have a lawful wife living.”
Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the information on various and sundry grounds and also filed a joint motion in arrest of judgment, all-of which motions were denied. The information was presumably founded upon Section 3526 of the General Statutes of Florida, which reads as follows:
“Whoever, having a former husband or wife living, marries another person, or continues to cohabit with such second husband or wife in this State, shall (except in the cases mentioned in the following section) be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.”
If so, we are of the opinion that it is fatally defective in that, for aught that appears therein to the contrary, the defendant, Mattie Brid-ges, was the lawful wife of the other defendant, Amos C. Teston, who are attempted to be charged with the offense of unlawful continuous cohabitation-As to the requirements for an information or indictment founded on this statute, see Cathron v. State, 40 Fla. 468, 24 South. Rep. 496, and Ferrell v. State, 45 Fla. 26, 34 South. Rep. 220. Examining the information in the light of these two cases, it is obvious that it fails to comply with the requirements therein laid down.
If the information was founded on Section 3518 of the General Statutes of Florida, then it is fatally defective in failing to allege that the defendants lived in an open state of adultery. We would also refer to Tucker v. State, 35 Texas 113, and State v. Clinch, 8 Iowa 401. As the information fails to charge either offenses with the requisite certainty, the motions to quash should have been granted. Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other assignments.
Judgment reversed.
Taylok, Cockrell, Hocker and Whitfield, J. J., concur.
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Tampa Shipbuilding & Eng'g Corp. v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 (Fla. 1938)…those represented by the plaintiff, should be properly submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions from the court on the law applicable to the facts and circumstances rightly in evidence. See Southern Express Co. v. Williamson, 66 Fla. 286, 63 So. 433, L. R. A. 1916, 1208. This Court has in many cases settled the law controlling courts in directing verdicts on disputed questions of facts. If the evidence is conflicting or will admit of different reasonable inferences, or if there is evidence tend…1 / 2
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Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270 (Fla. 1942)…Co. v. Law-Engle Co., 98 Fla. 920, 124 So. 814; McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 So. 910; Starks v. Sawyer, 56 Fla. 596, 47 So. 513; Florida Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558; Southern Exp. Co. v. Williamson, 66 Fla. 286, 63 So. 433,” This rule was again approved in The Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Bell, et al., 147 Fla. 734, 3 So. (2nd) 487. Taking into consideration the speed of the car, the physical facts detailed above and all circumstances, we think under the law t…
Previewing 3 of 60 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ferrell v. State, 45 Fla. 26 (Fla. 1903)
- Cathron v. State, 40 Fla. 468 (Fla. 1898)