STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
R.N., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appeals a trial court's refusal to revoke a juvenile's driver's license after finding him delinquent for possessing alcoholic beverages under age 21. The appellate court reverses, holding that Florida law mandates driver's license revocation for such violations with no judicial discretion.
The court held that sections 562.111(2) and 322.056 are mandatory legislative directives requiring driver's license revocation with no judicial discretion. A finding of delinquency—not adjudication—is required to trigger the revocation mandate, and entry of a nolo contendere plea satisfies this requirement.
[1] A court must direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to revoke or withhold issuance of a violator's driver's license or driving privilege upon a findin…
[2] A statute mandating the revocation of driving privileges for a juvenile found delinquent for a specific offense does not allow for judicial discretion in applying the pen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no language in the statutes that allows a court to use its discretion in applying the penalty.”
Establishes that sections 562.111(2) and 322.056 are mandatory, not discretionary
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceR.N., a minor, was charged with possessing alcoholic beverages while under age 21 in violation of section 562.111. He entered a plea of nolo contender…
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PETERSON, Judge.
The state appeals the trial court’s decision not to order the revocation of the Florida driver’s license of R.N., a child, after finding him delinquent and placing him in a community control program. We reverse.
R.N. was charged, inter alia, with committing the delinquent act of possessing alcoholic beverages while under the age of twenty-one in violation of section 562.111, Florida Statutes (1991). R.N. pled nolo contendere, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed in a community control program until his nineteenth birthday. The trial court refused the state’s request to invoke the provisions of section 562.111 which states:
(2) In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of subsection (1), the court shall direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to withhold issuance of, or suspend or revoke, the violator’s driver’s license or driving privilege, as provided in s. 322.-056.
Section 322.056, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.055, if a person under 18 years of age is found guilty of or delinquent for a violation of's. 562.11(2), s. 562.111, or chapter 893, and:
(a) The person is eligible by reason of age for a driver’s license or driving privilege, the court shall direct the department to revoke or to withhold issuance of his driver’s license or driving privilege for a period of:
1. Not less than 6 months and not more than 1 year for the first violation.
Both of these provisions are legislative mandates directing revocation of driving privileges for a juvenile who is found delinquent for violation of section 562.111. There is no language in the statutes that allows a court to use its discretion in applying the penalty.
Indeed, the legislature may have considered this to be an effective and inexpensive method to gain the attention of juveniles — who reportedly commit almost one-half of the reported crimes in Florida. It is noted that most of the court-ordered requirements of community control (e.g., attend school, study, obey parents) are rather normal activities for most non-delinquent children of R.N.’s age, and accomplishing them is hardly a reminder of the need to avoid illegal acts. Being required to use public transportation, school buses, and bicycles, and even walking, as alternatives to the convenience of an automobile might get the attention of R.N. and other juveniles. Perhaps the inconvenience will act as a reminder to avoid illegal acts in the future.
We find no merit in R.N.’s argument that the trial court’s failure to adjudicate him as a delinquent renders section 322.056 inapplicable. The statute does not require adjudication but requires only a finding of delinquency. By entering a plea of nolo contendere, R.N. did not contest committing the delinquent act. The court could not have placed R.N. in a community control program without having found him to be delinquent. See § 39.053(2), Fla.Stat. (1991).
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this cause for imposition of the revocation of R.N.’s driving privileges pursuant to section 562.-111(2).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COWART and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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State v. J.V.W., 739 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…the decision of whether to suspend the minor’s driver’s license was discretionary. The juvenile court’s ruling, while done in good faith, was erroneous. The acceptance of the no contest plea constituted a finding of delinquency. See State v. R.N., 597 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The withholding of adjudication was not the equivalent of a not guilty finding. The requirements of section 322.056(1) are mandatory, even when a no contest plea has been entered and adjudication has been withheld. See id. at 86…
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State v. M.L.R., 722 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…e juvenile guilty of or delinquent for certain alcohol, drug, or tobacco offenses. The trial court lacks discretion as to whether it can impose a suspension under this provision. See State v. M.A.P., 708 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. R.N., 597 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Upon a first violation, the trial court does have discretion as to the length of the suspension and may order the suspension for “[n]ot less than 6 months and not more than 1 year.” § 322.056(l)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (1997). Upon a s…
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State v. M.D., 706 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…is triggered when a person under 18 years of age “is found guilty or delinquent for a violation of [enumerated offenses].” M.D. entered a guilty plea. The trial court’s acceptance of the plea constitutes a finding of delinquency. See State v. R.N., 597 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Because the plea was entered and accepted while M.D. was 17 years of age, the trial judge was required to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend his driving privileges. Therefore, the failure to do…
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