DONALD LEE CRAIG, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Craig appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault, challenging the admissibility of statements he made to police. The court affirms, holding that even if an initial statement was improperly obtained, it was harmless error in light of a subsequent voluntary confession, and that confession was admissible because Craig himself reinitiated contact with police.
The court affirms the convictions. Even assuming the initial statement denying active participation was improperly obtained despite Miranda warnings due to improper continuation after an equivocal invocation of counsel, any error was harmless because Craig's subsequent admission that he was the shooter was admissible. The subsequent confession was constitutionally permissible because Craig himself reestablished contact with police approximately two hours after questioning terminated for the purpose of confessing, which reinitiation cured any Fifth Amendment defect.
[1] An erroneous admission of a statement, even if obtained after an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel, may be rendered harmless by a subsequent, properly admitted…
[2] A confession is considered voluntarily volunteered and constitutionally permissible when the accused reinitiates contact with the police for the purpose of admitting guil…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The reinitiation of the process cured any previous fifth amendment defect and rendered the decisive admission constitutionally permissible.”
Establishes the core holding that when a defendant himself reinitiates contact with police, it cures any prior Fifth Amendment violation from continued interrogation after invocation of counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCraig was questioned by homicide detective Singer about crimes including murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault. During questioning, Craig aske…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The only issue on this appeal from Craig’s convictions of first degree murder, armed robbery and aggravated assault concerns the admissibility of statements he made to the police. We affirm.
It may be assumed arguendo that the statement before us which indicated Craig was present at the scene but was not an active participant in the crimes should not have been admitted — even though it followed appropriate Miranda warnings— because it was engendered by questioning which improperly continued after what was at least an equivocal invocation of the de fendant’s desire for counsel. See Towne v. Dugger, 899 F. 2d 1104 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 536, 112 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990); Thompson v. State, 595 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1992).1 Any such error was, however, rendered harmless by a subsequent statement in which he admitted that he was the actual shooter. See Boles v. Foltz, 816 F. 2d 1132 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 167, 98 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987); Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla.1992); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla.1987) (“[Although it was error to admit Right’s initial statement to Officer Weeks, this error was harmless because the unwarned statement was merely cumulative to the subsequent properly admitted statements.”), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988); Segarra v. State, 596 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1992); State v. Bates, 804 S.W. 2d 868 (Tenn.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 131, 116 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991).
The trial court was correct, in turn, in refusing to suppress that confession because it was essentially volunteered when, some two hours after the questioning had terminated, Craig himself reestablished contact with the police for the very purpose of admitting his guilt.2 The reinitiation of the process cured any previous fifth amendment defect and rendered the decisive admission constitutionally permissible. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla.1992) (“ ‘Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protection ... provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities.’ Minnick v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 486, 492, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).”); Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966; Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 379 N.Ed.2d 1040 (1978); State v. Bates, 804 S.W. 2d at 868; see also Segarra, 596 So. 2d at 742; Lovett v. State, 516 A. 2d 455 (Del.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1898, 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987); Dickerson v. State, 325 A. 2d 367 (Del.1974); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E. 2d 201 (1975), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3210, 49 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1976); Granviel v. State, 723 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 461, 390 S.E. 2d 525 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 127, 116 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991).
Affirmed.
. While Craig was being questioned by Homicide Detective Singer, he asked to see Fandrey, another detective who was an acquaintance. He told Fandrey that when confronted with the evidence against him he had said to Singer, "if you got that against me, you might as well get me a lawyer." While Singer denied that the remark had actually been made to him, the admitted fact that Craig recounted it to Fandrey required Fandrey to cease questioning until the issue was resolved. See Thompson, 595 So. 2d at 18.
. After the statement denying responsibility, Craig was placed in a room in the police station awaiting transportation to the jail. While there, he overheard his co-defendant, who was being questioned in the next room, “throw him in” to the police. For that reason, he decided, for his own best interests, to confess his involvement. He then literally knocked on the door of the interview room, told Singer he wanted to confess and did so. There is no indication whatever that the confession arose out of a deliberate stratagem or any form of improper "interrogation" by the police. See Kight, 512 So. 2d at 926; compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); State v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and cases cited. Indeed, they were totally surprised by the confession.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Calder v. State, 133 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…er the defendant invoked his rights were likely to elicit incriminating responses and that the defendant’s confession was not freely and voluntarily made, despite the fact that the defendant reinitiated the conversation); but compare Craig v. State, 599 So. 2d 170, 170-71 & n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (even though the police continued questioning the defendant after what was at least an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel, the defendant’s subsequent reinitiation of the interrogation two hours later cured…
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Cruz v. State, 715 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…oses to reinitiate contact with the police. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986); Craig v. State, 599 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 605 So. 2d 1263 (Fla.1992). In this case, the record is clear that the defendant’s confession was precipitated by his voluntary reinitiation of contact with the police. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to su…
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Osmel Alvarez v. State, 774 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…fied renewed interrogation after he signed an appropriate Miranda waiver, see Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1992); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988); Craig v. State, 599 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1263 (Fla.1992); William E. Ringel, 3 Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 28.2(a)(l)(2000), thus validating the second confession. For these reasons, I agree that the statements were correctly in…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (21 total)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980)
- Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)
- Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1988)
- Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (U.S. 1990)
- Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1987)
- Williamson v. Florida, 485 U.S. 929 (U.S. 1988)
- Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1992)
- Holloway et ux. v. United States, 481 U.S. 1018 (U.S. 1987)
- Standley v. United States Tax Court (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 484 U.S. 872 (U.S. 1987)