GEORGE CRIBBS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
George Cribbs appealed his sentencing as a habitual offender following conviction of introducing contraband into a state prison, drug possession, and cannabis possession. The court affirmed the habitual offender classification for two counts but reversed as to a misdemeanor count and corrected the sentence for a third-degree felony to comply with statutory maximums.
Habitual offender classification based on same-date convictions is permissible under State v. Barnes. However, habitual offender status does not apply to misdemeanors, and the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony under habitual offender status is 10 years. The defendant's stipulation to illegal sentences does not bar appellate correction.
[1] Habitual offender status does not apply to misdemeanor convictions.
[2] A defendant cannot waive the right to challenge an illegal sentence, even by stipulation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant cannot concede to an illegal sentence”
Establishes that stipulation to habitual offender status does not prevent appellate correction of illegal sentence aspects
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCribbs was serving sentences for eight felonies convicted on February 22, 1990 when charged with introducing contraband into a state prison, possessio…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Illegal Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
George Cribbs has appealed from sentencing as an habitual offender following his conviction of introducing contraband into a state prison, possession of methamphetamine and possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
At the time the foregoing charges were brought, Cribbs was serving sentences for eight felonies, of which he was convicted on February 22, 1990. At sentencing for the instant offenses, Cribbs’ guidelines scoresheet reflected 398 points, corresponding to a recommended sentence of 20 years. In return for a 13-year sentence, Cribbs agreed to stipulate that he met the criteria for habitual offender classification. The state relied on the February 22, 1990 convictions to show that Cribbs qualified for that classification. The trial court found him so qualified, and imposed three concurrent 13-year sentences, to run consecutively to the sentences Cribbs was already serving.
Cribbs argues on appeal that he could not be classified as an habitual offender in that the qualifying convictions were entered on the same date, citing Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). He further points out that, as to Count II of the information charging possession of methamphetamine (a third-degree felony), his sentence exceeded the statutory habitual offender maximum of 10 years. Finally, he argues that he could not properly be classified as an habitual offender as to Count III of the information charging pos? session of cannabis, a misdemeanor. The state argues that Cribbs waived the first argument by stipulating that he qualified as an habitual offender, but concedes error as to the latter two arguments.
Cribbs’ argument that habitual offender classification cannot be based on non-sequential convictions was rejected in State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1992). However, Cribbs is correct that habitual offender status does not apply to misdemeanors (Count III), DuBose v. State, 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and that the maximum habitual offender sentence for a third-degree felony (Count II) is 10 years. Section 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla.Stat. (1989). Cribbs’ stipulations do not bar these arguments, in that a defendant cannot concede to an illegal sentence. Williams v. State, 591 So. 2d 948, 950 n. 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Further, the state concedes error, and seeks correction of Cribbs’ sentences.
Based on the foregoing, the habitual offender classification as to Counts I and II is affirmed. Habitual offender classification as to Count III is reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing. We also direct that, on remand, the sentence as to Count II be reduced to the 10-year statutory maximum.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
JOANOS, C.J., and MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Pace v. State, 662 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…3.147, Fla.Stat. (1989). We reverse as to Count II and remand for resentencing and for correction of the sentencing order that erroneously checked off the box indicating an enhanced “habitual offender” sentence for this misdemeanor. Cribbs v. State, 599 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Peterson v. State, 576 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The second issue relates to whether Appellant qualified for habitual felony offender classification and sentencing. This is the type of question that requires a factual de…
-
Freeman v. State, 616 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…law). Rule 3.800(a) allows a defendant to raise the legality of his sentence "at any time.” Although Freeman pled to the habitual offender sentence herein, a defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence as part of a plea bargain. Cribbs v. State, 599 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA1992). The question then becomes whether a sentence imposed under an unconstitutional sentencing statute constitutes an “illegal sentence” cognizable under Rule 3.800(a). The court in Judge addressed a defendant’s claim, in a Rule…
-
Watkins v. State, 622 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…termined illegal, the trial court had no authority to enter it, regardless of the plea agreement. Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla.1986) (a trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence pursuant to a plea bargain). Accord Cribbs v. State, 599 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Thompson v. State, 599 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As to the merits of the issue, before a HVFO sentence may be imposed, section 775.084(l)(b)(l) provides that the defendant must have been previously convicted of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1992)
- Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Williams v. State, 591 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Varick F. DuBOSE v. State, 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- In the Interest of F.M., Jr., 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)