RODERICK LORENZO WIMBERLY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1992-05-19
No. 91-1871
Before FERGUSON, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
599 So. 2d 715 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Roderick Wimberly appeals his convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, burglary, dealing in stolen property, and unlawful firearm possession. The court reverses and orders a new trial because the trial court improperly overruled Wimberly's peremptory challenge to a juror (juror Arce) based on ethnically neutral reasons unrelated to the juror's ethnicity.


Holding

The trial court erred in seating juror Arce. The stated reasons for the peremptory challenge—that the juror was an armed guard (similar to a police officer) and had recently been a crime victim—were ethnically neutral and should have been allowed. Because the improper juror sat on the jury that convicted the defendant, a new trial is required.


Headnotes

[1] A peremptory challenge to a juror is improperly overruled when the stated reasons for the challenge are ethnically neutral and the juror is seated over the objection.

[2] Hispanics constitute a cognizable group for purposes of challenges to jury selection.

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Key Quotes

“We conclude that the stated reasons were ethnically neutral.”

Establishes the standard that peremptory challenge reasons must be evaluated for ethnic neutrality under Neil.

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Facts & Procedural History

Wimberly was convicted of armed robbery, false imprisonment, burglary of a structure, dealing in stolen property, and unlawful possession of a firearm…

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, Judge.

COPE, Judge.

Roderick Lorenzo Wimberly appeals his convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, burglary of a structure, dealing in stolen property, and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. We reverse.

The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by overruling a peremptory challenge exercised by Wimberly, and ordering the juror to be seated. We conclude that the trial court erred in so doing.

At the time of the trial, the court correctly ruled that Hispanics are a cognizable group for purposes of State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984). The trial court’s position on that issue has subsequently been confirmed by this court’s decision in Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review pending, No. 79,542 (Fla.).

The trial court also was entirely correct in holding that the trial judge may seat a juror who has been improperly challenged within the meaning of Neil. That ruling has since been confirmed by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1992).

We part company with the trial court, however, in the decision to seat juror Arce at the trial in the present case. When the defense exercised a peremptory challenge against juror Arce, the court conducted a Neil inquiry. The defense argued that the juror was an armed guard for Brinks, and thus had an occupation which was very similar to that of being a police officer. In addition, the juror’s car had been stolen the previous week.1 We conclude that the stated reasons were ethnically neutral. See Adams v. State, 559 So. 2d 1293, 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA), dismissed, 564 So. 2d 488 (Fla.1990). As the peremptory challenge should have been allowed, and as the juror sat on the jury which convicted the defendant, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Because there must be further proceedings, we note the defense contention, and the State’s concession, that the defendant could not be adjudicated guilty of both armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of the same armed robbery. See Cleveland v. State, 587 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla.1991); Davis v. State, 590 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

. Although other crime victims sat on the jury, their experiences with crime were much more remote in time than that of juror Arce.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Betancourt v. State, 650 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …a. 3d DCA 1993) (same, challenge based on prospective juror or juror’s family members being victims of a crime); Williams v. State, 619 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (same, challenge based on black juror being victim of robbery); Wimberly v. State, 599 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (same, challenge based on occupation of Hispanic juror being similar to police officer); see also McClain v. State, 596 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (same, trial judge’s own objection to challenge of white prospective jurors), d…
  • Santiago v. State, 652 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …the challenge and ordered that Stone be seated as a juror. The reason offered by the defense for the peremptory challenge was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory one and it was error for the trial court to overrule the challenge. See Wimberly v. State, 599 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). A person with formal legal training is generally presumed to have analytical and forensic abilities that a lay person does not possess and thus could have a disproportionate influence on the deliberations. This status constituted…
  • Fernandez v. State, 639 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …and that there is a strong likelihood that the peremptory challenge is solely based upon membership in that distinct group. See Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla.1994); Neil; Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Wimberly v. State, 599 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Where all members of a cognizable group are challenged resulting in not a single member of that group being represented on the panel a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of justifying the peremptory challenge shi…

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