NORMAN WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1992-06-05
No. 91-00054
SCHOONOVER, C.J. and LEHAN, J., concur.
599 So. 2d 767 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992)

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Synopsis

Wright waived his right to a jury trial in exchange for a promise of no more than probation. After conviction at bench trial, the trial court imposed habitualized probation instead of straight probation, which violated the sentencing agreement. The court reversed the habitualization because Wright relied on the agreement in waiving his jury trial rights and had already suffered irrevocable prejudice through conviction.


Holding

The sentence of habitualized probation is reversed and remanded for imposition of straight probation as agreed. The conditions of probation relating to alcohol consumption are stricken as they do not reasonably relate to the crimes of conviction. The convictions are affirmed, but the sentence is reversed and remanded.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may not impose a sentence that exceeds the terms of a plea agreement or waiver agreement when the defendant has relied on that agreement to their detriment.

[2] A defendant who has waived their right to a jury trial based on an agreement with the state regarding sentencing cannot be subjected to a harsher sentence than agreed upo…

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Key Quotes

“Wright agreed to waive his right to a jury trial with the understanding that he would receive a sentence no greater than probation. The sentence imposed did not comport with the terms of the agreement.”

Establishes the core breach of the sentencing agreement by the trial court's imposition of habitualized probation

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Facts & Procedural History

Wright was charged with burglary of a structure and grand theft. He signed a waiver of jury trial with an explicit agreement that he would receive not…

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Opinion of the Court
RYDER, Judge.

RYDER, Judge.

We have for review six issues raised by Norman Wright, only two of which require discussion. Wright was charged with burglary of a structure and grand theft. Wright signed a waiver of trial by jury with an agreement that he would receive nothing harsher than probation if convicted. A bench trial was held and the trial court denied Wright’s motion for judgment of acquittal and found him guilty of both charges.

Wright was sentenced to two years’ probation on both charges to run concurrent. Wright was found to be a habitual felony offender and placed on “habitualized probation.” Defense counsel objected to the ha-bitualization of Wright stating that it was his and Wright’s understanding that the agreement was for straight probation without habitualization. Defense counsel further stated that Wright waived his right to a jury trial without knowledge that he may be habitualized. The record on appeal indicates that both the prosecutor and defense counsel thought Wright could not be habit-ualized under the agreement. The trial court did not advise Wright that it was not going to honor the agreement, and did not allow Wright the opportunity to revoke his waiver. This timely appeal followed.

Wright agreed to waive his right to a jury trial with the understanding that he would receive a sentence no greater than probation. The sentence imposed did not comport with the terms of the agreement. At the point that Wright was habitualized, he was exposed to greater penalties. Because Wright has already been tried and convicted, it is too late for him to withdraw his waiver. See Charatz v. State, 577 So. 2d 1298 (Fla.1991) (plea bargain may be specifically enforced if defendant has suffered irrevocable prejudice in reliance thereon). Accordingly, the sentence of ha-bitualized probation is reversed and the case is remanded for imposition of straight probation as was agreed to by the state and Wright.

The conditions of probation relating to the consumption of alcohol and which bar Wright from places where alcohol is sold or served are stricken, as they do not reasonably relate to the crimes for which Wright was convicted. See Daniels v. State, 583 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Rodriquez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

Appellant’s convictions are affirmed, but the sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

SCHOONOVER, C.J. and LEHAN, J., concur.


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