MICHAEL A. MROTEK AND ROMONA L. MROTEK, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND DON JAEGER, DIRECTOR OF BUILDING DEPARTMENT, CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, APPELLEES
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The court affirmed dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies but reversed the dismissal as with prejudice, holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicial policy matter, not a jurisdictional bar, and remanded for the plaintiffs to pursue the municipal administrative appeal process.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in circuit court is a judicial policy requiring deferral to the administrative process, not a jurisdictional defect, and therefore dismissal must be without prejudice.
[1] Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit in circuit court is a matter of judicial policy requiring deferral to the administrative process,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Mroteks filed a complaint in circuit court challenging a decision by the City of Boynton Beach's building department without first appealing throu…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm that part of the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint for appellants’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. It was, however, error to determine that the dismissal is with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The issue before the trial court is not jurisdictional but involves a judicial policy to defer to the administrative process by requiring appellants to pursue available and adequate remedies. Therefore, the dismissal should have been without prejudice.
Prior to proceeding in the circuit court, the Mroteks must appeal the decision of the city’s building department through the established municipal administrative appeal process. See generally Bruce v. City of Deerfield Beach, 423 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dep’t of Revenue v. Brock, 576 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 584 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1991); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Florida Dep’t of Nat. Resources, 536 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Skaggs-Albertson’s Properties, Inc. v. Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc., 332 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 346 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1977). In light of the initial stipulations of the parties in the trial court regarding appellants’ timeliness in pursuing remedies, the appellants upon remand shall be afforded 30 days from the date of the mandate within which to file a" new appeal with the city.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
HERSEY, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Brock, 576 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Skaggs-Albertson's Props., Inc. v. Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc., 332 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Bruce v. The City OF Deerfield Beach, 423 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Spicer v. Harper, 536 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- ST. JOE Paper Co. v. Fla. Dep't of Natural Res., 536 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc. v. Skaggs-Albertson's Props., Inc., 346 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1977)