TYRONE M. CLAYBOURNE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Claybourne appeals his habitual felony offender sentences, arguing that the 1989 amendment to Florida's habitual felony offender statute violates the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. The court reverses his sentences and remands for resentencing, holding that constitutional challenges to legislative acts can be raised for the first time on appeal when they affect a central issue in the litigation.
Constitutional challenges based on violation of the single subject rule can be raised for the first time on appeal when the challenged act affects a central, critical issue in the litigation. Because Claybourne's sentencing was directly affected by the habitual felony offender statute, he was entitled to raise the single subject challenge for the first time on appeal. His sentences are reversed.
[1] A challenge to the facial invalidity of a legislative act based on a violation of the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution may be raised for the first time on…
[2] A statute affecting a defendant's term of imprisonment is considered to affect a critical, central issue in the litigation, entitling the defendant to raise a single subj…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a facial invalidity challenge to an act of the legislature based upon violation of the foregoing provision can be raised for the first time on appeal, so long as the challenged act affects a central issue in the litigation”
Establishes the rule allowing constitutional challenges to be raised for the first time on appeal in appropriate circumstances
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaybourne was sentenced as a habitual felony offender under the amended version of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). The sentencing stat…
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ALLEN, Judge.
Appealing from his habitual felony offender sentences, Claybourne relies upon our holding in Johnson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), that Chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, by which the habitual felony offender statute was amended, violates the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. Because the prosecution failed to prove that Claybourne qualified for sentencing under the previous version of the statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), Claybourne argues that his sentences should be reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing. The state’s only response is that Claybourne is precluded from raising this argument because he neglected to raise it before the trial court.
We reverse Claybourne’s habitual felony offender sentences, remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing, and certify a question to the supreme court. Because the state does not question Claybourne’s contention that Johnson would entitle him to the relief he requests, we discuss only the state’s argument that the single subject challenge to Chapter 89-280 cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides in part, “Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.” An almost identical provision appeared in Article III, section 16, of the 1885 Constitution. It has long been recognized that a facial invalidity challenge to an act of the legislature based upon violation of the foregoing provision can be raised for the first time on appeal, so long as the challenged act affects a central issue in the litigation. See Parker v. Town of Callahan, 115 Fla. 266, 156 So. 334 (Fla.1934) (a challenge under the foregoing provision is an assertion of fundamental constitutional error and may be raised at any time); Town of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568, 23 So. 2d 843 (Fla.1945) (same); and Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1970) (disallowing a challenge raised for the first time on appeal, because the challenged act related only to whether attorney’s fees would be awardable to the prevailing party in a lawsuit).
Because Claybourne was sentenced under the habitual felony offender statute, the statute affected a critical, central issue in the litigation; i.e., Clayb-ourne’s term of imprisonment.
Accordingly, he was entitled to raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
As we did in Johnson, we certify the following question to the supreme court as a question of great public importance:
WHETHER THE CHAPTER 89-280 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1988), WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR TO THEIR RE-ENACTMENT AS PART OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES, BECAUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.
Clayboume’s habitual felony offender sentences are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
SHIVERS and MINER, JJ., concur.
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Thad McGillery Brown v. State, 609 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…in would not preclude him from contesting the legality of the sentence. With respect to the state’s argument that a single subject challenge cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, this point was addressed definitively in Claybourne v. State, 600 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and decided adversely tb the state’s position. Although neither party to this appeal has suggested a potential for conflict between the decision we reach here and this court’s prior decisions in Basilisco v. State, 593 So. 2d 5…
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Pride v. State, 603 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…court has recently squarely addressed the state’s argument and rejected it, concluding that a violation of the single-subject rule is a fundamental error in a case such as this, which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Claybourne v. State, 600 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Based upon the foregoing discussion, we vacate appellant’s sentence; and we remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. However, as we did in Johnson and Claybourne, we certify to the Supreme Court…
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Donahue v. State, 616 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…y conviction falls within that time frame and therefore may not be used in determining appellant’s habitual offender status. The state argues that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. This argument was rejected in Claybourne v. State, 600 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), approved, State v. Claybourne, 616 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1993), and Randall v. State, 601 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Appellant’s habitual violent felony offender sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. In…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970)
- Town OF Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568 (Fla. 1945)
- Johnson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Parker v. Town oe Callahan, 115 Fla. 266 (Fla. 1934)