GEORGE ROUSE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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George Rouse appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that probation violation sentences imposed pursuant to a plea bargain exceeded the permissible one-cell guideline bump-up under Lambert and Ree. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that such sentencing claims cannot be raised via Rule 3.800(a) motion and that plea bargain sentences are not subject to the one-cell limitation.
The court affirmed, holding that sentencing claims based on exceeding the one-cell bump-up guideline limitation cannot be advanced via a Rule 3.800(a) motion because such sentences are not truly illegal as a matter of law. Additionally, the court held that the one-cell bump-up limitation does not apply to sentences imposed as a result of an otherwise valid plea bargain agreement.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) is reserved for sentences that are illegal as a matter of law, such as those exceeding the statutory maximum.
[2] A claim that a sentence imposed for violation of probation exceeds the permissible one-cell maximum 'bump-up' under Lambert v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.800(a) is reserved for a narrow class of cases in which the sentence imposed can be described as truly "illegal" as a matter of law, for example, where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crime charged.”
Establishes the narrow scope of Rule 3.800(a) motions and explains why guideline-based sentencing challenges do not qualify.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRouse was initially charged with six counts of burglary and one count of possession of burglary tools in 1987, and two additional burglary counts in 1…
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PER CURIAM.
This case is before the court on appeal of the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.
On June 17, 1987, appellant, George Rouse, was charged with six counts of burglary and one count of possession of burglary tools. On July 2,1987, appellant was charged with two counts of burglary in another case. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pled nolo contendere to the nine charged offenses, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration on counts I and II in the first case and counts I and II in the second case. Appellant also received a term of probation for count III in the first case, to run consecutively to concurrent terms of probation for counts IV through VII in that case.
Following his release from incarceration, appellant was again charged with burglary on November 10, 1988. Appellant pled nolo contendere to this burglary charge with the understanding that he would receive a ten year sentence as an habitual felony offender, and with the further understanding that he would receive a five year sentence for violation of probation on count III of the prior case, to run consecutive to concurrent five year sentences for violation of probation on counts IV through VII. On direct appeal, this court per cu-riam affirmed appellant’s judgments and sentences. Rouse v. State, 563 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
On motion to correct an illegal sentence, appellant contends that the five year sentences imposed for violation of probation on count III and counts IV through VII exceed the one-cell maximum “bump-up” permissible under Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1989), and Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla.1990).1 Thus, appellant contends, he could not consent to the “illegal” sentence imposed, relying on Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1986), clarified in Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988).
Appellant’s claim may not be advanced via a Rule 3.800(a) motion. Rule 3.800(a) is reserved for a narrow class of cases in which the sentence imposed can be described as truly “illegal” as a matter of law, for example, where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crime charged. Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (en banc). Such is not the present case. Moreover, were it necessary to reach the merits of appellant’s claim, we would hold that the rule limiting the trial court to a one cell bump-up for a violation of probation does not apply where the sentence is imposed as the result of an otherwise valid plea bargain agreement.
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS, MINER and WOLF, JJ., concur. . At the time of his initial plea bargain agreement, appellant's guidelines scoresheet placed him in the recommended range of 2½ to 3½ years.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)…ntence imposed can be described as truly ‘illegal’ as a matter of law, for example, where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crime charged,” Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Rouse v. State, 601 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1992), this court nevertheless took the position that claims for additional presentencing jail or prison credit were exempt from this analysis and specifically held that “a sentence which does…
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Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…0(a) is reserved for a narrow class of cases in which the sentence imposed can be described as truly ‘illegal’ as a matter of law, for example, where the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crime charged.” Rouse v. State, 601 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1992). See also, Kelly v. State, 599 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As Judge Altenbernd noted in Brown, a challenge to the adequacy of determining a factual basis for a plea is not an allegatio…
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Loring Spencer Jones v. State, 635 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…direct appeal or by Rule 3.850 motion, in that the sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. However, several decisions of this court indicate this claim may be made in a Rule 3.800 motion. In its response, the state cited Rouse v. State, 601 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), review denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1992), in which this court, citing Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), review denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1992), said: “Rule 3.800(a) is reserved for a narrow class of cases in whic…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1989)
- REE v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990)
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)