GAIL PARISER, PETITIONER,
v.
PAUL S. PARISER, RESPONDENT
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The court did not issue a holding as this is a special concurrence.
This is a special concurrence discussing the emotional impact of divorce proceedings on children. The author expresses concern over psychiatric examin…
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PER CURIAM.
While the order in this case is an order entered after final judgment, it is part of a supplementary proceeding, a petition for change of custody of the minor children, and thus part of a new proceeding from which a second final judgment may emanate. Hence, it is not an appealable non-final order. However, the order grants a psychiatric examination of the children and the mother alleges that the harm will occur in the actual examination itself which will not be remediable on appeal of any final judgment. We therefore treat the instant case as a petition for writ of certiorari, but we deny the writ.
The granting or denying of an order for a psychological evaluation is a discretionary act. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Miami v. Modesta, 107 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). As such it is governed by the reasonableness test of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202-03 (Fla.1980). While petitioner maintains that the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, an evidentiary hearing is not always required. Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 470 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). A review of this record reveals sufficient information that based on Cana-karis we cannot say that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering these tests.
WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur. GLICKSTEIN, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
GLICKSTEIN, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion because of the stringent standard under which we review this case, I write separately to express my concern over the plight of the children involved. The record reveals that they have begun to experience negative feelings about themselves because of psychiatric examinations already undergone. I distinguish between evaluations or examinations of children by family therapists, psychologists and psychiatrists for the purpose of forensic forays, on the one hand, and individual and family therapy, on the other. Such examinations, sadly, often result in disparate opinions of forensic experts employed by the opposing parties. The parties then use these opinions to wage war against each other with the children falling as casualties along the way.
In adopting “no fault” divorce, we Floridians made no provision for family and individual therapy before allowing drive-in dis-solutions; and in my view, families have been needlessly imploding because of our ignorance about effective emotional therapy and our close-mindedness in repudiating the use of it. Sir James DeWars said it best when he reminded us that parachutes and minds only work when they are open. We have duly earned the title, The Age of Denial, in dealing with our own emotional health.
If the children in this case are balking, as I believe they are, at yet another examination, my empathy is with them, as an examination is not a substitute for a healing program which involves their parents and themselves. A legal dissolution does not eliminate the need to seek healthy emotional relationships among the parents and children nor justify examinations without follow up therapy and recovery.
Dr. Susan Forward, author of Toxic Parents (1989), at a 1991 talk in Fort Pierce asked the question, “Where was I when I needed me?” She suggested to us in the audience that each of us owed it to ourselves to make and keep six promises.
1. To recognize those beliefs which make us feel bad.
2. To realize that we are adults and able to change ourselves.
3. To understand that nothing is more important than our self-esteem.
4. To take responsibility for our own past, cruel behavior. 5. To confront those who have injured us.
6. To get professional help if we are and remain depressed.
A paradigm shift — a change in the way we think which results in a change in the way we feel — is not going to be achieved by an examination or an evaluation. It can be accomplished in therapy by a willingness to break through — after weeks, or months or even years — all of the coatings we have built up around our inner feelings. This begins with us parents, not our children; and it will not work for the children of that family where one parent refuses to become part of the effort. It is not easy. In fact, it is painful and often slow; but it works.
Melody Beattie in Codependent No More has defined codependency as letting another person’s behavior affect us, causing our obsession to control the other person’s behavior. We can only change ourselves, not others. Dr. Scott Peck’s book, The Road Less Travelled, remains on the New York Times paperback best seller list after 448 weeks. I mentioned its ongoing popularity in a concurrence in Jackson v. State, 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). It may still be there for the truth contained in the following lyrics of the song, Beauty and the Beast:
Tale as old as time
Tune as old as song
Bittersweet and strange
Finding you can change
Learning you were wrong.
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Gordon v. Smith, 615 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…that visits with the father should be suspended. He also said that, in his opinion, the number of adults and professionals, such as psychologists, who see the child should be limited for the child’s sake. As we recently held in Pariser v. Pariser, 601 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA1992), “the granting or denying of an order for a psychological evaluation is a discretionary act.” 601 So. 2d at 292. Hence, we can overturn this discretionary ruling only upon a conclusion that no judge could reasonably have ordered s…
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Russenberger v. Russenberger, 639 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1994)…HARDING, Justice. We have for review Russenberger v. Russenberger, 623 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), based on conflict with Gordon v. Smith, 615 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Pariser v. Pariser, 601 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the district court below because we find that a trial court must comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360 when a party…
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Russenberger v. Russenberger, 654 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…caused material injury. Russenberger v. Russenberger, 623 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Ray Russenberger appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, citing conflict with Gordon v. Smith, 615 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Pariser v. Pariser, 601 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Although the supreme court eventually found that no conflict was present, it did accept jurisdiction and approved this court’s decision. Russenberger v. Russenberger, 639 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1994). [*211] While his appeal was pendin…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Jackson v. State, 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Loudermilk v. Scobie, 470 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 470 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. OF Miami v. Modesta, 107 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)