CARLOS LUIS OBREGON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlos Luis Obregon appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting arguments concerning suppression motion reconsideration, the vehicle search, sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions.
The court affirmed the conviction on all grounds: trial courts have inherent power to reconsider suppression rulings; the vehicle search was permissible under Belton; sufficient evidence supported both charges; the motions for acquittal were properly denied; and the modified jury instruction was not erroneous because it was functionally equivalent to the standard instruction and imposed a more stringent burden on the state at the defense's tactical request.
[1] A trial court possesses the inherent power to reconsider a ruling on a motion to suppress while it retains jurisdiction over the case.
[2] A search of a defendant's vehicle is permissible under the principles established in New York v. …
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court has the inherent power to reconsider a ruling made on a motion to suppress, upon appropriate motion by either counsel, while that court has jurisdiction of the case.”
Establishes the legal standard for trial court reconsideration of suppression rulings and rejects the contrary holding in Radeka v. State.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceObregon was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia following a search of his vehicle. The trial court denied motions …
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PER CURIAM.
Carlos Luis Obregon appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
As to the first point on appeal, “A trial court has the inherent power to reconsider a ruling made on a motion to suppress, upon appropriate motion by either counsel, while that court has jurisdiction of the case. Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla.1982).” State v. Harvey, 573 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). See generally Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1388 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA) review denied 494 So. 2d 1153 (1986). The decision in Radeka v. State, 34 Fla.Supp.2d 59 (Fla. 9th Cir.Ct. 1989) is contrary to the foregoing authority and is not good law.
As to the second point, the search of the defendant’s vehicle was permissible under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
As to the third and fourth points on appeal, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the charges of possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The motions for judgment of acquittal were properly denied.
As to point five, we find no error. Defense counsel objected to the use of element two in the Florida Standard Jury Instruction for possession of drug paraphernalia under subsection 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Element two of the Standard Jury Instruction states, “(Defendant) had knowledge of the presence of the drug paraphernalia.” Defendant urged that the instruction instead should follow the exact language of the statute. Element two was therefore replaced, at defendant’s request, with the instruction that defendant “used or possessed with the intent to use certain drug paraphernalia.”
On appeal the defense contends that it was fundamental error to give the instruction as requested. The defense now urges that the new phraseology should have been added to the existing element two of the Standard Jury Instruction (“had knowledge of the presence of drug paraphernalia”).
Defendant’s position is without merit. In the first place, the defense specifically asserted that the “knowledge” portion of the instruction was in conflict with the statute1 and that the instruction would be more precise if it used the exact language of the statute instead. It is evident that this request was a tactical choice on behalf of the defendant, since the special instruction arguably imposed a more stringent burden of proof on the State, at least in the factual circumstances of the present case. The instruction as given was, in our view, functionally equivalent to the Standard Jury Instruction and encompassed the necessary scienter element — the special instruction required actual use, or possession with the specific intent to use, the paraphernalia.
Affirmed.
. We express no opinion on whether there is any inconsistency between the instruction and the statute.
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Goodwin v. State, 826 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…the court. Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla.1982)(determining that a trial court has the power to reconsider a ruling made on a motion to suppress upon motion by either party while the court has jurisdiction of the case); Obregon v. State, 601 So. 2d 616, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(same). While it is true that the court has the power to reconsider an interlocutory ruling on a motion to suppress, this does not mean that the filing of such a motion tolls the time for filing an appeal. Wagner v. Bieley, W…
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State v. Graham, 721 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…t has jurisdiction of a case, and upon appropriate motion or objection made by either counsel, it has the inherent power to reconsider a previous ruling made on a motion to suppress. Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla.1982); Obregon v. State, 601 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s reconsideration of its denial of the motion to suppress. The State also asserts that several of the trial court’s findings are without basis in the evidence and therefore warran…
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Williams v. State, 160 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…tion made by either counsel, it has the inherent power to reconsider a previous ruling made on a motion to suppress.” State v. Graham, 721 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla.1982); Obregon v. State, 601 So. 2d 616, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)). It is critical, however, that the “appropriate motion or objection” originate from one of the parties, lest the trial court torpedo its role as an impartial arbiter. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. WARNER and GROSS…
Authorities Cited
- New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1981)
- THE Florida BAR v. Schell, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982)
- Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Harvey, 573 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)