GEORGE W. PRICE, APPELLANT,
v.
E. D. MCLEOD, JAMES MCLEOD AND ERNESTINE E. ABBOTT, APPELLEES

Fla. | 1914-03-04
Shackleford, C. J., and Cockrell, Hocker and Whitfield, J. J., concur.
67 Fla. 171 Florida Supreme Court (1914) Caution
Also reported at: 64 So. 769
Cited by 89 cases

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Synopsis

George W. Price purchased an undivided one-fifth interest in land at a sheriff's sale and claimed he acquired prescriptive title to the entire property through adverse possession. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's partition decree, holding that Price's occasional use of the land and tax payments were insufficient to establish exclusive adverse possession against his co-tenants.


Holding

Price did not acquire prescriptive title to the entire property. His sheriff's deed conveyed only the one-fifth interest owned by the judgment debtor F. McLeod, and his occasional use of the land for firewood, posts, clay, and sand—without enclosing, occupying, or improving it—was insufficient to establish exclusive adverse possession against his co-tenants or put them on notice of an adverse claim.


Key Quotes

“No act of his in reference to said land even tended to put his co-tenants on notice that he was claiming, the entire interest and estate in said land adversely to them, and his deed from the sheriff only conveyed to him such interest and estate therein as was owned by the judgment debtor, F. McLeod, the same being an undivided one-fifth interest and estate therein.”

The court's holding that Price's limited actions did not constitute adverse possession against co-tenants and his deed was limited to only the judgment debtor's one-fifth interest.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lucy H. McLeod died intestate owning land in Columbia County. Her heirs were her husband F. McLeod, sons E.D. and James McLeod, daughter Mary Crowley …

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Opinion of the Court
Taylor, J.

Taylor, J.

The appellees as complainants below filed their bill in the Circuit Court for Columbia County against the appellant as defendant below for partition of certain described lands situated in said county. Upon the pleadings and proofs taken the court below rendered a decree in favor of the complainants for partition of said lands, and the defendant below brings such a decree here for review by appeal.

The bill alleges, and the proofs sustain its allegations, that said lands belonged to Mrs. Lucy H. McLeod who died intestate leaving as her heirs-at-law her husband, F. McLeod, since deceased, two sons, the complainants, E. D. and James McLeod, and one daughter, Mary Crowley, since deceased, and a grand-daughter, the complainant, Ernestine Abbott. That the interest and estate of the said Mary Crowley in said land has since passed by conveyance to the complainant, James McLeod; that about the year A. D. 1892, the interest and estate of the said F. McLeod in said land, the same being an undivided one-fifth interest therein, was sold by the sheriff of said county under a judgment and execution against the said F. McLeod and was purchased at said sheriff’s sale by the defendant George W. Price, who obtained a sheriff’s deed thereto; that the complainant James McLeod is now the legal owner of an undivided two-fifths interest and estate in said land, the complainants, E.

D. McLeod and Ernestine Abbott and the defendant, George W. Price, are the owners each of an undivided 'one-fifth interest and estate therein. The defendant Price in his an swer alleges that since the date of his purchase at the sheriff’s sale on February 7th, 1893, he has been continuously in the sole and exclusive adverse possession of the whole of said land under color of title conveyed to him by such sheriff’s deed and has acquired prescriptive title to the whole thereof as against the complainants and all others. The proof shows that ever since the sheriff’s sale of the one-fifth interest and estate of F. McLeod in said land the whole of said land has been unenclosed, unoccupied, unimproved and wild; that after his purchase the said defendant occassionally got fire-wood, and fence posts for his domestic uses, and some clay and sand therefrom, and paid the annual taxes thereon, and got various persons living in the vicinity to prevent trespassers from cutting and taking wood and timber therefrom, and occasionally went over said land in person. No act of his in reference to said land even tended to put his co-tenants on notice that he was claiming, the entire interest and estate in said land adversely to them, and his deed from the sheriff only conveyed to him such interest and estate therein as was owned by the judgment debtor, F. McLeod, the same being an undivided one-fifth interest and estate therein. Under the pleadings and proofs the decree of the court below in said cause was proper, and it is hereby affirmed at the cost of the appellant.

Shackleford, C. J., and Cockrell, Hocker and Whitfield, J. J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (58 total)

  • Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735 (Fla. 1917)
    …rational view that may be taken, it is in positive conflict with some identified or designated provision of Constit# tionál law.”' Pinellas Park Drainage Dist. v. Kessler, 69 Fla. 558, 68 South, Rep. 668; City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 South. Rep. 769; Jackson v. Neff, 64 Fla. 326, 60 South. Rep. 350. And that “our State Constitution „is a limitation upon power; and unless legislation duly passed be clearly contrary to some express or implied prohibition in the Constitution, the courts have no a…
  • Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Lawton Priest, 67 Fla. 370 (Fla. 1914)
    …nto the power of. the legislature to lawfully enact a particular statute; and all doubts as to its constitutionality are resolved in favor of the statute. McNeil v. Webeking, 66 Fla. 407, 63 South. Rep. 78; City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. —, 64 South. Rep. 769; Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, — Miss. —, 64 South. Rep. 461; State v. J. J. Newman Lumber Co., — Miss. —, 59 South. Rep. 923. At common law one whose wrongful act or omission injures or destroys property of another is liable in damages for the…
  • …t subject to review by the courts, whose province is not to regulate, but to effectuate the policy of the law as expressed in valid statutes.” Also see McNeil v. Webeking, 66 Fla. 407, 63 South. Rep. 728; City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 South. Rep. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 D 99; Anderson v. City of Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 South. Rep. 775, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 287; Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 South. Rep. 282; Noble v. State, 68 Fla. 1, 66 South. Rep. 153; Jordan v. Duval County, 68 Fla…

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