MARIA ELENA IBANEZ-VOGELSANG, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
GEORGE C. VOGELSANG, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court's equitable distribution of marital assets, including the home, was supported by competent and substantial evidence and followed statutory criteria, thus it could not be disturbed.
The wife claimed a one-half interest in the marital home, which the husband acquired before the marriage and was conveyed to them as tenants by the en…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Presumption Of Marital Asset cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
This appeal arises from a judgment, entered on the wife’s complaint, dissolving a six-week marriage. Mrs. Ibanez-Vogel-sang claims a one-half interest in property acquired by Mr. Vogelsang prior to the marriage, which was conveyed to the parties as tenants by the entireties on their wedding day.
The question presented in the wife’s appeal is whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s decision to award the husband the parties’ $900,000 home, which he brought to the marriage as his separate property and sole substantial asset. On balance the court awarded the wife, who came to the marriage as a self-employed and financially independent professional, a $35,000 diamond ring, $16,000 in rehabilitative alimony, and $26,000 in attorney’s fees.
Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (1991), creates a presumption that individually-owned real property transferred to a tenancy by the entireties is marital property subject to equitable distribution, regardless of its original acquisition. Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla.1991). In distributing marital assets, the trial court is guided by a broad array of factors codified in subsection (1) of the statute. Those factors include (1) the economic circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage, (3) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital assets, and (4) any other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
We assume, without deciding, that the husband did not rebut the presumption that the parties intended the property to be subject to equitable dissolution on divorce. Nevertheless, because the court’s distribution of the marital assets, including the home, follows the statutory criteria and is supported by factual findings in the order based on competent and substantial evi dence as required by section 61.075(3), it cannot be disturbed. Russ v. Russ, 576 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. Neil M.J. Williams, 686 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ay have been a factor affecting the trial court’s decision concerning permanent periodic alimony,3 the length of this marriage was not so short as to justify an unequal distribution absent other compelling factors. Cf. Ibanez-Vogelsang v. Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (no abuse of discretion in awarding husband in six-week marriage the parties’ $900,000 home, which was husband’s premarital property and sole substantial asset). The parties here were married long enough so that over the years th…
-
Franklin v. Seretha C. Franklin, 988 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…of premarital assets were brought into very short-term marriages. Williams, 686 So. 2d at 808-10 (discussing McMonagle v. McMonagle, 617 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), which involved a less than two-year marriage, and Ibanez-Vogelsang v. Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), which involved a six-week marriage). Here, the parties had a long-term marriage of thirty-seven years, and the Wife’s parents made gifts to both the Husband and the Wife during the course of the marriage. The record does not est…
-
Vashti Cattaneo v. Cattaneo, 803 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…al assets. See McMonagle v. McMonagle, 617 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (an equal split “ ‘may be a good starting point’ in some dissolution cases, but it should not end with an inequitable result in any case”); Ibanez-Vogelsang v. Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); see generally, Victoria M. Ho & Rebecca Y. Zung, Special Equity and Unequal Distribution of Assets, Fla. Bar J. 79, 81 (Nov.2001). Next, the former wife submits that $1,700.00, representing the value of furniture, was not alloca…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1991)
- Russ v. Russ, 576 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)