CHARLES B. STRIPLING, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1992-07-14
No. 91-1512
Before BASKIN, FERGUSON, and JORGENSON, JJ.
602 So. 2d 663 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Stripling appeals his convictions for armed robbery, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, assault, and display of a firearm stemming from an armed grocery store robbery. The court affirms most convictions but reverses the firearm display conviction as duplicative of the armed robbery charge, quashes an unsupported three-year mandatory minimum, and remands for resentencing.


Holding

The court affirmed convictions for armed robbery, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and assault, but reversed the conviction for unlawful display of a firearm because the single act of using the same firearm in the same robbery cannot form the basis for a separate conviction. The court quashed the three-year mandatory minimum term for armed robbery due to lack of evidence that Stripling personally possessed a firearm, and remanded for resentencing because life sentences are permissive rather than mandatory.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction and sentence for unlawful display of a firearm during the commission of a felony cannot stand when the underlying robbery conviction is enhanced due to the u…

[2] Life sentences imposed as a habitual felony offender are permissive, not mandatory.

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Key Quotes

“When a robbery conviction is enhanced because of the use of a firearm in committing the robbery, the single act involving the use of the same firearm in the commission of the same robbery cannot form the basis of a separate conviction and sentence.”

Establishes the double punishment principle that prevents a separate firearm display conviction when the robbery was enhanced by firearm use.

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Facts & Procedural History

Stripling and three codefendants were charged with crimes arising from an armed grocery store robbery where the owner was shot. Detectives eating brea…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Stripling appeals from judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated battery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, assault, and display of a firearm during the commission of a felony. For the following reasons we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Stripling and three codefendants were charged with various offenses stemming from the armed robbery of a grocery store, store employees, and the shooting of its owner. The getaway was witnessed by detectives who were eating breakfast near the crime scene. The detectives chased the getaway car, eventually captured the car’s occupants, and recovered stolen food stamps, cash and jewelry taken from the victims in the store.

Following a trial, Stripling was convicted as a habitual felony offender on the armed robbery counts and sentenced to life terms. The court also imposed a three-year minimum mandatory sentence on the armed robbery counts. In addition, Stripling was sentenced to thirty years for aggravated battery and display of a firearm during the commission of a felony and ten years for aggravated assault.

We affirm the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and assault. However, the conviction and sentence for unlawful display of a firearm during the commission of a felony cannot stand.

[WJhen a robbery conviction is enhanced because of the use of a firearm in committing the robbery, the single act involving the use of the same firearm in the commission of the same robbery cannot form the basis of a separate conviction and sentence... (emphasis added).

Cleveland v. State, 587 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla.1991). We therefore reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence for unlawful display of a firearm.

In this case it appears that the trial court may have been operating under the misapprehension that it was required to sentence Stripling to life terms as a habitual felony offender for the armed robbery counts. Life sentences are permissive, not mandatory, under sections 775.084(4)(a)(1) and 775.084(4)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (1989). Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992). Therefore, we remand for a new sentencing hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to sentence the defendant without uncertainty about the discretion it may exercise.

In addition, there is no evidence to support the imposed three-year minimum mandatory term on the armed robbery counts. Nowhere in the record do we find evidence that Stripling personally possessed a firearm during the robbery. The three-year mandatory term is hereby quashed. See State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270 (Fla.1992) (statute does not permit enhancement without evidence of personal possession of weapon). See also Belcher v. State, 550 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (defendant cannot be subjected to three-year minimum mandatory sentence for possession of firearm where there is no evidence that defendant had actual possession of firearm during commission of crime).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, armed robbery sentence quashed, and remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Stripling v. State, 645 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …ction 775.087, Florida Statutes, is used to enhance the felony or impose a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. See State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270, 1271-72 (Fla. 1992); Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957, 958-59 (Fla. 1977); Stripling v. State, 602 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).…
  • Gracia v. State, 98 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …zar v. State, 892 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Mondesir v. State, 814 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Sousa, 903 So. 2d 923 (Fla.2005); Mosely v. State, 679 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stripling v. State, 602 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Washington v. State, 597 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The next and harder issue, however, and the only one which has practical significance, is which of the two sets of convictions and sentences should be vacated. A mistake li…
  • Johnson v. Singletary, 625 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …iction is error. The state recognizes that Johnson was not accused of being in actual possession of a firearm, and that no evidence was introduced demonstrating he possessed one. Thus, the minimum mandatory sentence was improper. Stripling v. State, 602 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Belcher v. State, 550 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Appellate counsel should have raised these points on appeal. His failure to do so demonstrates a deficient prejudicial performance. Accordingly, we grant the petition for w…

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