INAPRO, INC., AND CIGNA INSURANCE CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
ANDREW M. LEINOFF, AS RECEIVER FOR HOFRICHTER, QUIAT AND ZUCKERMAN, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed judgment for the receiver in the amount of $78,414.97 but reversed the trial court's modification of the jury's determination regarding the payment due date, remanding to reinstate the jury's date for purposes of calculating prejudgment interest.
A trial court properly enters judgment for the plaintiff on a directed verdict motion, but errs in changing the jury's special interrogatory determination of the payment due date when evidentiary support exists for the jury's conclusion.
[1] A trial court may grant a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the evidence does not support a jury verdict, but should not modify a jury's speci…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceINAPRO, Inc. and CIGNA Insurance Co. were sued by Andrew M. Leinoff, as receiver for Hofrichter, Quiat and Zuckerman, regarding outstanding invoices. …
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PER CURIAM.
INAPRO, Inc. and CIGNA Insurance Co. appeal the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion for judgment in accordance with motion for directed verdict or, alternatively, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We conclude that the trial court was correct in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff/appellee in the amount of $78,-414.97. While such motions should be cautiously granted, Fountainhead Motel, Inc. v. Massey, 336 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 324 (Fla.1977), we conclude that on this point the order is entirely correct. We take a different view, however, with regard to that part of the order which changes the jury’s special interrogatory determination of the date on which payment of the outstanding invoices was due. In our view there was an evidentiary basis on which the jury could reach the conclusion that it did. We therefore reverse that part of the order under review and remand with directions to reinstate the jury’s determination as to the date payment was due, which will be the date from which prejudgment interest will run.
The disposition of this appeal is without prejudice to appellants to pursue such indemnification rights as they may have with respect to the amounts appellants are required to pay.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.