LEE GIUSTI REALTY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
L.D. CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A real estate broker appeals a trial court judgment denying him a commission on a property sale, claiming he was the procuring cause. The court affirms, finding the broker failed to meet the legal standard for procuring cause because neither the buyer nor seller knew of his involvement or intentionally excluded him from negotiations.
The trial court properly determined the broker was not the procuring cause of the sale because both the buyer and seller must know of the broker's involvement and intentionally exclude him for the broker to claim procuring cause status. Here, neither party knew of the broker's involvement, so the legal standard was not met.
[1] A real estate broker is the procuring cause of a sale when they bring the purchaser and seller together and effect the sale through continuous negotiations, unless the se…
[2] For a seller and buyer to intentionally exclude a broker, both parties must have knowledge of the broker's involvement and intent to exclude them.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a broker, to be considered the 'procuring cause' of a sale, must have brought the purchaser and seller together and effected a sale through continuous negotiations inaugurated by him unless the seller and buyer intentionally exclude the broker and thereby vitiate the need for continuous negotiations.”
Establishes the legal standard for procuring cause that requires both parties to know of and intentionally exclude the broker
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a real estate broker, held an oral open listing on appellee's property. He showed the property to one partner of a joint venture, who discl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Procuring Cause cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, a real estate broker, challenges the trial court’s judgment which determined that he was not a procuring cause of a real estate transaction and thus not entitled to a commission on the deal. We affirm.
The evidence revealed that appellant who had an oral open listing on appellee’s property showed it to one partner of a joint venture who disclaimed any interest. Appellant never informed appellee of this contact. Unbeknownst to appellant, the other partner then met with appellee and negoti ated a sale. Two days before the closing, appellant learned of the transaction and demanded a commission from appellee, who refused.
Appellant’s theory of recovery was that he was the procuring cause of the sale based upon Sheldon Greene & Associates v. Rosinda Investment, N.V., 475 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), which held that:
a broker, to be considered the ‘procuring cause’ of a sale, must have brought the purchaser and seller together and effected a sale through continuous negotiations inaugurated by him unless the seller and buyer intentionally exclude the broker and thereby vitiate the need for continuous negotiations.
Id. at 927. In other words, both parties must know of the broker’s involvement and intend to exclude him. In fact, the trial court remarked that “you not only have to have knowledge on the part of the buyer that he is [excluding] the broker, you’ve got to have knowledge on the part of the vendor that the broker’s involved.” This theory is not supported by the facts of this case construed most strongly in favor of appellee, as they must be. The buyer who negotiated with the appellee testified that he was never involved with the broker, nor did he make his contact with the property through anything involving the broker, and appellee’s vice-president testified that he asked the buyer about any involvement with a broker and was assured that no broker was involved.
While some evidence was disputed, there was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination. We therefore affirm.
DOWNEY, WARNER, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
S. Pac. Enters. v. Cornerstone Realty, Inc., 672 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ot resist the broker’s claim for commission by arguing that it did not participate in the sales negotiations where the parties themselves had specifically and purposefully excluded the broker from negotiations. Lee Giusti Realty, Inc. v. L.D. Corp., 603 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Sheldon Greene & Assocs., Inc. v. Rosinda Invs., N.V., 475 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review dismissed, 502 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1987); American United, Inc. v. Kroll Realty, Inc., 443 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Alc…
-
Easton-Babcock & Assocs., Inc. v. Fernandez, 706 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…ated by him or her, unless the purchaser and seller intentionally exclude the broker and thereby vitiate the need for continuous negotiations. See Whitehead v. Dreyer, 698 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Lee Giusti Realty, Inc. v. L.D. Corp., 603 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Edwards v. Brandon Realty, Inc., 497 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Sheldon Greene & Assocs., Inc. v. Rosinda Investments, N.V., 475 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review dismissed sub nom. Horn v. Sheldon Greene &…
Authorities Cited
- Sheldon Greene & Assocs., Inc. v. Rosinda Invs., N.V., 475 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)