RIESA HAAS AND ARTHUR HAAS, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
WOODEN SHOE GARDENS, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1992-08-26
No. 91-0527
Hersey, J., Gunther, J., Farmer, J.
603 So. 2d 146 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1992)

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Synopsis

The court reversed summary judgment for a contractor, holding that whether a defect in goods or services was latent or obvious is a factual question for the jury, not a matter of law for the trial court.


Holding

A contractor may be liable for defects in improvements even after acceptance by the owner if the defect is latent rather than obvious, and whether a defect is latent is a question of fact for the jury.


Headnotes

[1] Whether a defect in a contractor's work is latent or obvious is a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for summary judgment, even when the owner had knowled…

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Key Quotes

“building contractor not liable for injuries to third parties after acceptance of improvement by owner unless defect is latent”

Citing Slavin v. Kay for the principle that latency of defect determines contractor liability after acceptance

Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs purchased property with a tree that had boards attached to it by the defendant contractor. The boards became loose over time, and plaintiff…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s summary judgment that the defect in defendant’s goods and services, about which plaintiffs complain, was so obvious as to discharge this contractor from liability. From the facts presented in this record, we conclude that plaintiffs presented a factual dispute as to whether the defect was latent, in which case defendant could be liable. See Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1958) (building contractor not liable for injuries to third parties after acceptance of improvement by owner unless defect is latent); Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 551 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1989) (whether defective nature of condition was obvious to third party exercising reasonable care is question of fact for jury).

We do not believe, for example, that the new owners’ knowledge of the presence of the boards on the tree necessarily means as a matter of law that they also knew or should have known that the boards had been so insecurely attached as to be a danger to one seeking to remove them, as they allege. In fact, defendant’s principal testified that a homeowner would not likely recognize that with the passage of time the nails holding the boards might easily come out. We remand for a trial on the issues.

REVERSED.

HERSEY, GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.


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