BENAJA PROPERTIES, INC., NARD S. HELMAN AND DAVID F. YOUNG, APPELLANTS,
v.
RICHARD A. MURNO, P.A. AND GERALD FISCHER, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1992-07-08
No. 91-02653
RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
603 So. 2d 548 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that the corporate seller is liable for brokerage commission and fees, but the corporate president and attorney are not personally liable for breaches of fiduciary duty.


Headnotes

[1] A corporate officer who signs a contract solely in a representative capacity for the corporation is not personally liable on the contract.

[2] A party seeking to impose personal liability on individuals for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty must present evidence of a clearly imposed duty and a breach thereof.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellees, real estate brokers, sued appellant Benaja Properties for a commission and attorney's fees based on a contract. They also sued individual a…

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Opinion of the Court
CAMPBELL, Judge.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellants, Benaja Properties, Inc., Nard S. Helman and David F. Young, challenge the final judgment awarding a real estate brokerage commission and attorney’s fees to appellees based on a real estate broker’s commission contract between Benaja Prop erties and appellees, Richard A. Murno, P.A. and Gerald Fischer. Appellant Benaja Properties was the seller of the real estate involved. Appellant Young, president of Benaja Properties and an attorney, signed the contract solely in his representative capacity as president. Appellant Helman, who was-acting as attorney for Benaja Properties, did not sign the contract. Hel-man and Young were personally and individually joined in the action below on a tort theory involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties to appellees, who were appellant Benaja Properties’ brokers for the real estate sale. The final judgment found that appellants each were liable, jointly and severally, to appellees for the real estate brokerage commission and attorney’s fees.

While we find no error in the final judgment finding appellant Benaja Properties liable for the brokerage and attorney’s fees, we do find error in the final judgment insofar as it found appellants Helman and Young personally liable for those fees. Appellant Young was a signatory to the commission contract but was not a party to it as he was acting not as an individual but signed specifically as president for appellant Benaja Properties. Appellant Helman did not sign the contract at all. Young and Helman had been joined as defendants solely on a tort theory for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties to appellees. We find a lack of evidence to support a breach by appellants Helman and Young of a clearly imposed duty to appellees that will support the final judgment against them.

We, therefore, affirm the final judgment against appellant Benaja Properties. We reverse the judgment imposing personal liability against appellants Helman and Young.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Marshall v. Karin Arnold-Dobal, D.O., 76 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …al defendants, John Marshall, signed the employment agreement, he signed in his representative capacity as president of Damus, Ecker, Rosenthal and Marshall, M.D., P.A., rather than in his individual capacity. See Benaja Props., Inc. v. Murno, P.A., 603 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (where defendant was personally and individually joined as a defendant, he could not be found liable under a contract which he signed specifically as president of appellant company). Thus there are no allegations of concerted misc…

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