TERRY E. MIDDLETON, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHELE CARTER MIDDLETON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's paternity determination finding that the appellant was not the biological father of the appellee's unborn child, holding that the determination was premature and violated due process because it was made at an ex parte hearing without proper notice to the appellant. The dissolution of marriage was affirmed.
The court reversed the paternity determination, holding that it violated due process to predicate a paternity determination on an ex parte hearing conducted without notice regarding the paternity issue. Although the court could resolve the dissolution issue without delay, it should not have proceeded to resolve the paternity issue at a hearing noticed only for dissolution.
[1] A court may not determine paternity ex parte without notice to the putative father.
[2] A paternity determination is premature when made without affording the putative father an opportunity to be heard on that specific issue.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it would offend the essential requirements of due process to allow a paternity determination to be predicated upon the ex parte hearing which was conducted without any notice as to the issue of paternity”
Establishes the core holding that due process requires notice regarding paternity issues before such determinations can be made
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe incarcerated appellant petitioned for dissolution of marriage. The appellee counterpetitioned, claiming she was pregnant but that the appellant wa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ex Parte Hearing cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges a dissolution order which indicated that he was not the biological father of the pregnant appellee’s yet-to-be born child. In light of the due process concerns which are impacted by the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the determination of paternity was premature.
This action was initiated when the incarcerated appellant petitioned for dissolution. The appellee counterpetitioned, averring that she was pregnant but alleging that the appellant was not the father of the yet-to-be bom child. The appellant responded that he could possibly be the child’s father, and requested a determination of paternity. The court scheduled a hearing “for Dissolution of Marriage only.” The appellant sent the court letters again referring to the question of paternity, and the court advised the appellant that it was construing the correspondence as a motion for a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) blood test to determine paternity.
Without further notice to the appellant, the court held a hearing which was not attended by the appellant, but which was attended by the appellee, her counsel, and her supporting witness. Based on the testimony which the appellee presented, the court found that the parties did not have intercourse during the pertinent period of time for conception. Determining that there was no reason to delay the proceeding, the court entered an order dissolving the parties’ marriage and reciting that the appellant was not the biological father of the pregnant appellee’s yet-to-be born child.
Although it was not necessary for the court to postpone the hearing or adjudication on the issue of dissolution, this was the only matter noticed for the hearing, and the court should not have proceeded to resolve the issue of paternity. Furthermore, it does not appear that the court required the requested HLA test as directed by section 742.12(1), Florida Statutes. We conclude that in the circumstances presented, it would offend the essential requirements of due process to allow a paternity determination to be predicated upon the ex parte hearing which was conducted without any notice as to the issue of paternity.
The appealed order is reversed insofar as it addresses the issue of paternity. The order is otherwise affirmed, and the cause is remanded.
BOOTH and SMITH, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Middleton v. Middleton, 623 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…s. On the first occasion, we reversed the trial court’s determination that appellant was not the father of a child born to appellee during the parties’ marriage, and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of paternity. Middleton v. Middleton, 603 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA1992). On remand, the trial court postponed determination of the paternity issue until appellant’s release from incarceration. (Appellant has a 20-year state sentence and a 15-year federal sentence to serve.) We again reverse. On remand…
-
Hully v. Hully, 653 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…when the court heard and determined matters that were not the subject of appropriate notice. The husband was not prepared, nor was he required to be prepared, to argue against the default. Levitt, 454 So. 2d at 1071. See also Middleton v. Middleton, 603 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), appeal after remand, 623 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Devaney v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 564 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Cardet; Barreiro v. Barreiro, 377 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Additionally, once the wife withdr…