DONALD LLEWELLYN WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Williams appealed his drug possession conviction and sentence, challenging the trial court's determination of habitual offender status, alleged discrepancies between oral and written sentences, and the imposition of costs without notice. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence but struck the costs and remanded for proper notice proceedings.
The court held that no error occurred regarding the oral versus written sentence discrepancy, that determining habitual offender status prior to sentencing does not constitute error because it is a ministerial determination requiring no judicial discretion, and that the non-statutorily-mandated costs were properly stricken for lack of notice or opportunity to be heard.
[1] A trial court's determination of habitual offender status is a ministerial act, and therefore, determining such status prior to the sentencing hearing does not constitute…
[2] A written sentence is consistent with an oral pronouncement when probation is ordered consecutive to incarceration, if the total period of probation aligns with the oral…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The determination of habitual offender status is a ministerial determination.”
Establishes that habitual offender status determination requires no judicial discretion, so its timing before sentencing creates no error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He pled no contest to both counts. The trial court sentenced him…
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RYDER, Judge.
We have for review three sentencing issues raised by Donald Llewellyn Williams. Williams was charged with one count of possession of cocaine and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. He pled no contest to both counts as charged and the trial court sentenced Williams to two and one-half years’ incarceration followed by two years’ “habitualized” probation on count I and to one year probation on count II. The trial court also imposed the following costs without providing any statutory authority: $50.00 court improvement fund; $50.00 cost of prosecution; $25.00 Hillsbor-ough County Drug Abuse Fund; and $25.00 crime lab fund.
Williams first claims that the trial court deviated from its oral pronouncement of one year probation on count II in the written sentence. However, it is clear from the document entitled “Order of Probation” that Williams is to serve one year probation consecutive to the incarceration imposed for count I, consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement. Accordingly, we find no error on this point.
Williams next contends that the trial court erred in determining Williams to be a habitual offender before his sentencing hearing. The determination of habitual offender status is a ministerial determination. See King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Because the trial judge has no discretion in determining habitual offender status, determination prior to the sentencing hearing does not constitute error. Williams finally argues that the trial court erred in imposing costs without notice and an opportunity to be heard. We agree. The costs assessed against Williams are not statutorily mandated costs and are therefore stricken for lack of notice or opportunity to be heard. See Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The state may seek to reimpose these costs after proper notice and opportunity to be heard. Siplin.
Williams’ conviction and sentence are affirmed, but the costs are stricken and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed, but remanded for further proceedings.
LEHAN, C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…he court improvement fund, the drug education fund, and costs of prosecution cannot be imposed unless a defendant is given notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the record recites the statutory authority for their imposition. Williams v. State, 604 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The record here fails to reflect compliance with these requirements. Finally, we hold again that if costs of prosecution are based on section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1993), then the state has the burden of proving the amount o…
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Cathcart v. State, 643 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…tionary, and therefore notice is required. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The defendant must have an opportunity to be heard, and the record must state the statutory authority for the imposition of the costs. Williams v. State, 604 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Moreover, if costs of prosecution are based on section 939.01, Florida Statutes, the state has the burden of proving the amount of these costs, and the court must consider the defendant’s financial resources before imposing them.…
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Madison v. State, 664 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…sis laboratory system) pursuant to section 893.13(8)(b) are discretionary with the court. Thus, such costs cannot be imposed without giving a defendant the opportunity to challenge them at a hearing, prior to their imposition. See Williams v. State, 604 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (cost to county drug abuse fund was not a statutorily mandated cost, and thus had to be stricken for lack of notice or opportunity to be heard); Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (discretionary costs assessed f…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Columbus Ferry Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)