STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
ANDREAS OBOJES, ETC., RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that heightened premeditation or calculation—a careful plan formulated with cold forethought—remains a valid reason for imposing a departure sentence in sexual battery cases, clarifying and limiting language from Hernandez v. State that had been misconstrued by the district court.
Premeditation or calculation is a sufficient reason for departure in sexual battery cases only if it is of a heightened variety—consisting of a careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold forethought. This holding is limited exclusively to sexual offenses and does not apply to crimes that inherently involve cold forethought, such as conspiracy or drug trafficking.
[1] Advance planning and premeditation are permissible reasons for a departure sentence in sexual battery cases.
[2] Heightened premeditation or calculation, consisting of a careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold forethought, is a sufficient reason for departure in a se…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Premeditation or calculation is not an inherent component of the crime of sexual battery and may support a departure sentence.”
Establishes the foundational principle from prior case law (Casteel and Lerma) that premeditation can justify departure in sexual battery, contrary to the district court's interpretation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAndreas Obojes was convicted of sexual battery offenses involving a woman whom he stalked over a two-week period in May 1989. The trial court imposed …
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Obojes v. State, 590 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which certified the following question of great public importance:
Whether, in light of that language contained in Hernandez v. State, 575 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla.1991), concerning premeditation or advance planning, that reason remains a valid reason justifying the imposition of a departure sentence in sexual battery cases?
Obojes, 590 So. 2d at 465. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. Andreas Obojes was convicted of several offenses associated with the sexual battery of a woman whom he stalked over a two-week period in May 1989. There is no question that Obojes’ criminal conduct exhibited considerable advance planning and premeditation. The trial court then imposed departure sentences. Among the reasons given were the advance planning and premeditation Obojes had exhibited in committing the sexual batteries.
On appeal, the district court reversed based on a single paragraph in Hernandez, 575 So. 2d at 642. There, we rejected “professionalism” as a valid reason for departure, and then made the following comment:
We believe there is little distinction between planning and premeditation and the professional manner in which a crime is committed. As we have stated, the facts relied upon in this case and in many of the district court cases cited above reveal planning on the part of each defendant, not skillfulness. This type of planning is common to most crimes and thus cannot constitute a valid reason for departure.
Id. Based on this comment, the district court rejected advance planning and premeditation as a valid reason for departure when sentencing on a sexual battery conviction. Obojes, 590 So. 2d at 464-65.
We believe this conclusion overlooks other relevant portions of our Hernandez opinion as well as other case law dealing specifically with sexual battery. Foremost, Hernandez was not dealing with sexual battery, but with trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine — crimes vastly different from sexual battery. Hernandez, 575 So. 2d at 642. Second, it is settled that advance planning and premeditation are permissible reasons for a departure in the context of sexual battery. E.g., Casteel v. State, 498 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1986); Lerma v. State, 497 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds, Rousseau v. State, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1987). As we.stated in Casteel,
“Premeditation or calculation is not an inherent component of the crime of sexual battery” and may support a departure sentence....
Casteel, 498 So. 2d at 1252-53 (quoting Lerma, 497 So. 2d at 739)). It was not our intention in Hernandez to recede from this holding.
We do agree, however, that the intent underlying our holdings in Casteel and Lerma requires clarification. Accordingly, we hold that premeditation or calculation is a sufficient reason for departure in a sexual battery case only if it is of a heightened variety. To this end, heightened premeditation or calculation consists of a careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold forethought. See Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). We limit this holding exclusively to sexual offenses, and stress that heightened premeditation never can be a reason for departure in cases that inherently involve cold forethought, such as conspiracy or drug trafficking cases.
Accordingly, the certified question is answered in the affirmative. The stalking of the victim in this case clearly meets the requirement of a careful plan formulated with cold forethought. The decision under review is quashed and the opinion below is disapproved to the extent it is inconsistent with our views above, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the guidelines.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, shaw, grimes, kogan and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Audano v. State, 641 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…hen preyed on her unusual vulnerability, adds nothing to the second reason articulated by the judge. “Premeditation or calculation is a sufficient reason for departure in a sexual battery ease only if it is of a heightened variety.” State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla.1992). Heightened premeditation consists of a careful plan formulated with cold forethought. Obojes at 475. There is no support in the record for the court’s finding that Audano’s behavior was equivalent to the stalking in Obojes. The fin…
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Jory v. State, 647 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…explained: While many crimes can be said to be premeditated, there are only a few which are so carefully planned and executed as to warrant an extraordinary sentence. Hallman, 560 So. 2d at 227. The Florida Supreme Court held in State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474 (Fla.1992), that premeditation and calculation are sufficient reasons to support a departure sentence in a sexual battery case if it is of a “heightened variety,” carefully planned and prearranged with “cold forethought.” In Obojes, the defendant ha…
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Moening v. State, 615 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ation or calculation” for purposes of a departure sentence was improper since it is inherent in the crime of theft that a defendant intends — i.e., calculates and premeditates — to convert the property of another to his own use. See State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the trial court are reversed and this cause is remanded for entry of a judgment of guilt to a third degree felony and imposition of an appropriate sentence therefor. REVERSED AND REMANDED.…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (U.S. 1954)
- Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Rousseau, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1987)
- Ervin Sharp v. State, 497 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Soliman v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 484 U.S. 1020 (U.S. 1988)
- Ward v. Sentry Title Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 1020 (U.S. 1988)
- Casteel v. State, 498 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1986)
- Hernandez v. State, 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991)
- Andreas Obojes v. State, 590 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)