JEREMIAH DAVIS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Jeremiah Davis was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, he challenged the admission of dying declarations from the victim identifying his shooters and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding the dying declarations were properly admissible as part of the res gestae.
The trial court correctly admitted the dying declarations as part of the res gestae, as they were statements made by the deceased immediately following the shooting to witnesses present at or near the scene. The evidence was amply sufficient to support the verdict of guilty.
“We are of the opinion that the trial court correctly ruled that this statement formed part of the res gestae and, therefore, did not err in refusing to strike it out.”
The court's holding that the dying declarations were admissible as part of the transaction or event itself, establishing the standard for admitting such statements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharlie Davis was shot and killed. Witness Charlie Jackson was approximately 25-30 steps away when the shooting occurred and reached the deceased with…
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Shackleford, C. J.
Having been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death, Jeremiah Davis seeks relief here by writ of error. Three errors are assigned, the first two of which are based upon the admission of certain testimony, and the third upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial. The first two assignments are argued together, each being predicated upon the refusal of the trial court -to strike the testimony of two witnesses for the State as to what Charlie Davis,, with the unlawful killing of whom the defendant was charged, said to such witnesses as to who shot him. The bill of exceptions discloses that one of the witnesses, Charlie Jackson, testified that he was within about twenty-five or thirty steps of the deceased when the gun fired wliicli killed him and that the witness went directly to the deceased as soon thereafter as he could walk to him, estimating the time at one or two minutes, when the deceased stated to the .witness that the defendant and one oher person, lvhom he designated as “Sheet,” had shot him. We are of the opinion that the trial court correctly ruled that this statement formed part of the res gestae and, therefore, did not err in refusing to strike it out. See Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 South Rep. 749, and authorities therein,cited. This applies with like force to the statement made by the deceased to the other witness, Mary Davis, so that it becomes unnecessary to set out the details, v
The only grounds of the motion for a new trial which are argued are those which question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. After a careful examination of all the evidence we are of the opinion that it is amply sufficient. The trial court refused to disturb the verdict and we must do likewise. See Williams v. State, supra.
Judgment affirmed.
Taylor, Hocker and Whitfield, J. J., concur. Cockrell, J., absent by reason of illness in his family.
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Citator
Cited By
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Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533 (Fla. 1923)…uch circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction itself. Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 South. Rep. 749; Davis v. State, 68 Fla. 81, 66 South. Rep. 429; Reid v. State, 68 Fla. 105, 66 South. Rep. 725; People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 Am. Dec. 49; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 19 N. E. Rep. 453, 2 L. R. A. 520; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Texas 657…
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Carnley v. State, 88 Fla. 281 (Fla. 1924)…rom McGahagin v. State, 17 Fla. 665. Other assignment go to matters that under the law of this State are for determination by the jury, and we see no reason to disturb their finding. Williams v. State 68 Fla. 88, 66 South. Rep. 424; Davis v. State, 68 Fla. 81, 66 South. Rep. 429; Peeler v. State, 64 Fla. 385, 59 South. Rep. 899; Clark v. State, 59 Fla. 9, 52 South. Rep. 518. The verdict is a reasonable deduction from the evidence, was approved by the trial court and is affirmed. Whitfield, P-. J., and…
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Young v. State, 70 Fla. 211 (Fla. 1915)…Clinton v. State, supra. The remaining grounds of the motion question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. No useful purpose would be accomplished by setting forth or discussing the evidence adduced. As we held in Davis v. State, 68 Fla. 81, 66 South. Rep. 429, following prior decisions of this court, “When the trial court concurs in the verdict rendered by a jury by denying the motion for a new trial, and there is evidence to support it, an appellate court should refuse to disturb it,…
Authorities Cited
- Turner Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138 (Fla. 1909)