EDWARD A. BRAYTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
EDWARD A. BRAYTON, APPELLANT,
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
605 So. 2d 138
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992)
Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. All of appellant’s allegations are either facially insufficient or conclusively refuted by the portions of the record that the trial court attached to its order of denial. With respect to appellant’s allegation challenging the constitutionality of the habitual offender statute as violative of the single subject rule, see McCall v. State, 583 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev. granted, 593 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.1992).
LEHAN, C.J., and PARKER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Hannon v. Lorain A. Hannon, 740 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…e courts should attempt to give effect to nuptial agreements that are, as here, properly made and fully enforceable. The foregoing analysis is vexed by our own decisions in Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), and Ryland v. Ryland, 605 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), both of which broadly state that a party who has by agreement relinquished any claim to the other’s nonmari-tal property can nonetheless still be awarded lump sum alimony at the discretion of the trial court. In these cases, as…
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Reyes v. Nevis Reyes, 714 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…child, as well as alimony and child support, we remand for reconsideration of all the awards. Inasmuch as property, alimony, child support and other economic provisions of a marriage dissolution judgment are intertwined, see, e.g., Ryland v. Ryland, 605 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Mollnow v. Mollnow, 530 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), we reverse as to all such provisions and remand for revisitation by the trial court and for new determinations which are consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED…
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Liberoff v. Liberoff, 711 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…ent.2 We find no merit in the former husband’s alternative arguments for affir-mance. The former husband is incorrect in his assertion that the March 9 Agreement is nothing more than an unenforceable gratuitous promise to pay. See Ryland v. Ryland, 605 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bayshore Royal Co. v. Doran Jason Co. of Tampa, 480 So. 2d 651, 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Further, where the former husband has accepted the benefits of an agreement he may not renounce his obligations thereunder. See Fineber…
Authorities Cited
- Kemp v. State, 583 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)