GREGORY REEVES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Defendant Reeves appeals his 15-year departure sentence imposed upon probation revocation after being originally placed on community control as a youthful offender for cocaine delivery. The court reverses and remands because application of a 1990 statute amendment to his 1988 offense would violate the ex post facto clause.
The court held that application of the 1990 amended statute to Reeves' sentencing would constitute an impermissible ex post facto law because the statute was amended after his offense and clearly served to increase his potential incarceration length. Accordingly, the sentence may not exceed the six-year cap applicable to youthful offenders under the original law.
[1] Applying a statute amended after the commission of the offense to increase the potential length of incarceration constitutes an impermissible ex post facto law.
[2] A substantive violation of probation or community control may subject a youthful offender to provisions beyond the normal statutory cap on sentence length.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“application of a statute amended in 1990 which clearly serves to increase the length of incarceration to which he could be subject would constitute an impermissible ex post facto law under both the Florida and United States Constitution”
States the core holding that applying post-offense statutory amendments violates the ex post facto clause
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReeves was 17 years old when he committed cocaine delivery in March 1988 and was placed on community control as a youthful offender pursuant to a plea…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Substantive Violation Of Probation cases and more on FLexlaw
LEHAN, Chief Judge.
Defendant appeals from the departure sentence imposed upon the revocation of his probation. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Defendant was originally placed on community control as a youthful offender pursuant to a plea agreement after he had pleaded guilty to the offense of delivery of cocaine. At the time he committed that offense in March 1988, he was 17 years of age. He thereafter committed multiple violations of the terms of his required supervision (first the terms of his original community control and later the terms of other dispositions including probation) on six separate occasions. The last occasion was a March 1991 violation of probation which included the substantive offense of resisting arrest without violence, of which defendant was found guilty, as reflected in the revocation order. The departure sentence now being appealed is 15 years incarceration, which is an eight-cell bump-up from the recommended nonstate prison sanction disposition in the first cell. (His original community control pursuant to the plea had been a one-cell departure.)
Both defendant and the state agree that the 15-year departure sentence went too far. See Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273 (Fla.1992). The bone of contention is whether, as the state argues, a bump-up is permissible for each of defendant’s six violations, which would put him in the seven to nine years range, or whether, as defendant argues, the general six-year cap on youthful offender sentences applies under section 958.04(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). The parties appear to agree that resolution of this dispute boils down to the question of whether the amended version of section 958.14, effective October 1, 1990 (see chapter 90-208, sections 19 and 22, Laws of Florida), applies to defendant.
The amended version of section 958.14 operates to subject a youthful offender to the general provisions of section 948.06(1) beyond the normal six-year cap for such an offender when the offender commits a substantive violation of probation or community control. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant’s having resisted arrest without violence constituted such a substantive violation. There is also no dispute that section 958.14 as amended was in effect at the time defendant committed the substantive violation in March 1991, a fact upon which the state relies in its argument that the six-year cap may be exceeded.
However, as defendant points out, section 958.14 was amended well after defendant had committed the offense of delivery of cocaine in March 1988. Since defendant was being sentenced for a crime he committed in 1988, we conclude that application of a statute amended in 1990 which clearly serves to increase the length of incarceration to which he could be subject would constitute an impermissible ex post facto law under both the Florida and United States Constitution. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); Swinson v. State, 588 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Therefore, the sentence may not exceed the foregoing six-year cap.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2001)…(Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Robinson v. State, 702 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Hill v. State, 692 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Johnson v. State, 678 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Dunbar v. State, 664 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reeves v. State, 605 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). While no Florida decision until Meeks had undertaken the task of specifically defining “substantive” or “technical/nonsubstantive,” we do gain some insight through an analysis of how specific violations have been classified by va…
-
Isaiah Dunbar v. State, 664 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Darden v. State, 641 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). A youthful offender can be sentenced in excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive. See § 958.14, Fla.Stat. (1993); Reeves v. State, 605 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The consecutive sentences are reversed with directions to impose concurrent sentences with the appropriate credit for time served. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.…
-
Schebel v. State, 721 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…nded to allow for a longer sentence for a substantive probation violation, the state recognizes that the amended statute cannot be applied to appellant, because of the ex post facto prohibition. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990); Reeves v. State, 605 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The state notes, however, that the trial court was not limited by the youthful offender act as to the new offenses, but that, based upon the facts alleged by appellant, the case should be remanded to the trial court for attachmen…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1987)
- Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1992)
- Swinson v. State, 588 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)