JEAN COTTRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK R. MISKOVE AND LESLIE R. MISKOVE, APPELLEES; BEACON GROVES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION NOT FOR PROFIT, APPELLANT, V. TERRENCE ECCLESTON AND MARGARET ECCLESTON, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This consolidated appeal addresses whether a subdivision's restrictive covenant prohibiting "commercial vehicles" in driveways and streets is enforceable or impermissibly ambiguous. The court reversed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief, holding that "commercial vehicle" is not ambiguous and that pickup trucks used in a pool-service business violate the covenant.
The court held that "commercial vehicle" is not ambiguous or vague. The two words "commercial" and "vehicle" are well-defined terms that do not become ambiguous when combined. The exception for service vehicles "while in the process of performing their services" indicates the association's intent to exclude vehicles such as the pickup trucks in question unless parked in a covered garage.
[1] Restrictive covenants are presumed valid and will not be invalidated unless clearly ambiguous, wholly arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of public policy or constituti…
[2] Ambiguity in a restrictive covenant must be resolved against the party seeking enforcement.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity because each property owner has adequate notice of the restrictions and purchases his property knowing of, accepting, and relying upon them.”
Establishes the strong presumption in favor of enforcing restrictive covenants and the standard for invalidation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo homeowners in a subdivision with restrictive covenants regularly parked pickup trucks used in their swimming pool-service business on streets or i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Enforceability Of Restrictive Covenants cases and more on FLexlaw
BLUE, Judge.
This is a consolidated appeal involving the enforceability of a subdivision’s restrictive covenant which provides, “no commercial vehicles shall be parked uncovered” in streets or driveways. In each case the trial court ruled that the term “commercial vehicle” was clearly ambiguous and denied the injunctive relief sought. We disagree and reverse.
The plaintiffs in the actions below were Jean Cottrell and Beacon Groves Homeowners Association, Inc. (collectively referenced as the “association”).
The defendants were Mark and Leslie Miskove and Terrence and Margaret Eccleston (collectively referenced as the “vehicle owners”).
The vehicle owners reside in a subdivision having the following provision within its declaration of covenants and restrictions: “No trailers, campers, boats or commercial vehicles of any kind shall be parked on or adjoining the property, unless inside a covered garage, with the exception of delivery vehicles or service vehicles while in the process of performing their services.” Each vehicle owner often parked a pickup truck used in his swimming pool-service business on the street or in the driveway. Each truck bore the pool-service’s name on the cab and on the rear of the vehicle and contained the tools and supplies necessary for pool service in the exposed bed.
Restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity because each property owner has adequate notice of the restrictions and purchases his property knowing of, accepting, and relying upon them.
Accordingly, courts will not invalidate restrictions unless they are clearly ambiguous, wholly arbitrary, unreasonable in application, or violative of public policy or a fundamental constitutional right. Constellation Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla.2d DCA 1985).
We recognize that covenants restraining the free use of property are to be strictly construed in favor of the grantee and that ambiguity in a restriction must be resolved against persons claiming enforcement. Where, however, the provision governing the dispute sufficiently evidences the intention of the parties, it will be enforced. McKay v. Townson, 528 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla.2d DCA 1988).
We acknowledge the principle that restrictions limit the free use of property. Restrictions also protect the interests of all the other property owners who buy in reliance upon them and courts should, whenever possible, uphold these valuable property rights.
Both counsel as well as this court were unable to locate any reported decision in which the term “commercial vehicle” was held to be vague, ambiguous, or unclear. The words “commercial” and “vehicle” are well defined terms. Black’s Law Dictionary 270 and 1554 (6th ed. 1990).
Courts have utilized discoverable dictionary meanings when faced with similar questions. Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (1971).
When the two words “commercial” and “vehicle” are combined, we hold that they do not become vague, ambiguous, or unclear. In this particular case, the language in the questioned restriction, which makes an exception for “delivery vehicles or other service vehicles while in the process of performing their service”, indicates the as sociation’s intent to exclude the motor vehicles in question from being parked on or adjoining the property unless inside a covered garage. Failure to enforce the restriction would thwart the clear intention of all property owners of the subdivision, including those in this case, who have purchased property in reliance upon the restrictive covenants.
The decision of the trial court is reversed, and each of these cases is remanded for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
PARKER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mizell v. Deal, 654 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…a restriction which sufficiently evidences the intent of the parties and which is unambiguous will be enforced according to its terms. Sweeney v. Mack, 625 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.1994); Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We find the construction urged by the Deals is both illogical and unreasonable. There is no reason the restriction should not be enforced according to its terms. Mizell is correct that the trial court erred in finding that she h…
-
Clear Channel Metroplex, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 922 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…s “reasonably necessary to the continued proper use of said facilities for their present purposes [.]” (Emphasis added). This restrictive covenant, as are all restrictive covenants, is clothed with a presumption of validity. See Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(“Restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity because each property owner has adequate notice of the restrictions and purchases his property knowing of, accepting, and relying upon them.”). As such, the…1 / 2
-
Eckerd Corp. v. Corners Grp., Inc., 786 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…ed use of real property, a restriction which sufficiently evidences the intent of the parties and which is unambiguous will be en [*591] forced according to its terms. Mizell v. Deal, 654 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). See also Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Put another way, although restrictive covenants should be narrowly construed in favor of the free transferability of property, they should never be construed in a manner which would defeat the plain and obvious purpose and intent…
Authorities Cited
- Sterling Vill. Condo., Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Constellation Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- State v. Gustafson, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971)
- McALLISTER v. State, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971)
- Dorvil v. State, 528 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)