D.E., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1992-09-29
No. 91-332
Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.
605 So. 2d 574 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1992) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A juvenile appellant challenged his adjudication for unlawful possession of cocaine, arguing the evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because it was abandoned during an illegal chase. The court affirmed, holding that because the appellant abandoned the cocaine before being seized in the Fourth Amendment sense, the evidence was not fruit of an illegal stop.


Holding

The court held that the cocaine was not subject to suppression because D.E. was not seized in the Fourth Amendment sense at the time of abandonment. Since the cocaine was abandoned before any Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, it could not constitute fruit of an illegal stop.


Headnotes

[1] A seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when a person is taken into custody, not merely when police initiate a chase.

[2] Evidence abandoned by a suspect fleeing from police is not the fruit of an illegal seizure if the abandonment occurs before the suspect is taken into custody.

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Key Quotes

“the respondent abandoned the subject cocaine after fleeing from a police officer, but prior to being taken into custody by the officer. This being so, the abandonment of the subject cocaine by the respondent was not, as urged, the product of an illegal seizure of the respondent's person”

Establishes the temporal sequence critical to the holding—abandonment occurred before custody/seizure

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Facts & Procedural History

A police officer chased D.E., a juvenile, who fled. During the chase, but before being taken into custody, D.E. abandoned cocaine. The officer subsequ…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the respondent, D.E., from an adjudication of delinquency and dispositional order for unlawful possession of cocaine which was entered below based on the respondent’s nolo contendere plea. In entering this plea, the respondent expressly reserved for appeal the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the subject cocaine based on Fourth Amendment grounds. We affirm.

It is clear, based on this record, that the respondent abandoned the subject cocaine after fleeing from a police officer, but prior to being taken into custody by the officer. This being so, the abandonment of the subject cocaine by the respondent was not, as urged, the product of an illegal seizure of the respondent’s person, State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla.1992), because the defendant’s person was not seized by the police within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time of the cocaine abandonment. The fact that the police officer had no probable cause to arrest the respondent and no reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the respondent when the chase began cannot change this result because the respondent was not seized in the Fourth Amendment sense while being chased by the police officer. The respondent was seized in the Fourth Amendment sense only when the respon dent was taken into custody; by that time, however, the cocaine had already been abandoned and consequently cannot constitute the fruit of the stop of the respondent. California v. Hodari D., — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); State v. Green, 601 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); State v. Hollinger, 596 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); State v. Wilson, 595 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Wade v. State, 589 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Butler v. State, 579 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (no seizure where officers got out of their car and before they said anything, the defendant fled).

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Johnson v. State, 689 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …either willingly obeys or is physically forced to obey the police request. As such, there is no unlawful seizure when the person “drops then stops,” even where the drop occurs after an order to stop. 680 So. 2d at 631. Similarly, in D.E. v. State, 605 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the court allowed into evidence cocaine that had been discarded during a police pursuit: The fact that the police officer had no probable cause to arrest the respondent and no reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the respo…

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