ROYAL SERVICES, INC., AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
RICHARD L. SMITH, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a workers' compensation attorney's fee award of $25,000 because the Judge of Compensation Claims failed to analyze all statutory factors required under section 440.34(1) before departing from the statutory fee schedule.
When a Judge of Compensation Claims departs from the statutory fee schedule in section 440.34(1), the order must reflect consideration of all relevant prescribed factors and determine whether the departure is justified by the overall effect of those factors.
[1] When departing from the statutory attorney's fee schedule under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, a workers' compensation judge must analyze all relevant prescribed fa…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoyal Services, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company appealed a workers' compensation order awarding claimant's counsel $25,000 in attorney's fee…
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KAHN, Judge.
The employer and its carrier, Royal Services, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (E/C), appeal from a final workers’ compensation order directing them to pay attorney’s fees of $25,000.00 to claimant’s counsel. The E/C argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in departing from the statutory fee schedule without including an analysis of each factor set forth in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1987). We reverse and remand.
When the JCC departs from the statutory fee schedule contained in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, the order should reflect that the JCC considered “all relevant prescribed factors to the extent the circumstances permit.” Dobbs v. Suncoast Acoustics, 590 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). See Fumigation Dep’t v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Capin, 450 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The JCC should also determine whether a departure is justified by considering the overall effect of the factors in section 440.-34(l)(a)-(h). Marsh v. Benedetto, 566 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The order in the instant case does not set forth a sufficient analysis of the factors in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h) and does not indicate whether the JCC considered all of the factors before imposing a fee in excess of the statutory amount. Accordingly, the order must be reversed and remanded for the JCC to make specific findings in accordance with section 440.34(l)(a)-(h) and to determine whether these factors justify an increase in the statutory fee award.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ„ concur.
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Willis v. State, 656 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…must serve 15 years without eligibility for release for 10 years. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written sentence, a remand is necessary to conform the written sentence to the oral pronouncement. Brown v. State, 605 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court with instruc [*262] tions to conform the 'written sentence to the oral pronouncement. ERVIN, MINER and BENTON, JJ., concur.…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Matilde Capin and the Division of Workers' Compensation, 450 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Fumigation Dep't & Claims Ctr. v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Marsh v. Carlos Benedetto and the Division of Workers' Compensation, 566 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Dobbs v. Suncoast Acoustics & Claims Ctr., 590 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)