STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY LEE LEWIS, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1992-09-30
No. 90-00414
DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
605 So. 2d 590 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida appeals the suppression of evidence seized from a dwelling pursuant to a search warrant, arguing that the trial court erred in finding the evidence had become 'stale' before the warrant was issued and executed. The Second District Court of Appeal reverses, holding that the warrant was timely issued and executed within applicable statutory and case law standards.


Holding

The court holds that the evidence should not be suppressed on staleness grounds. The warrant was timely issued within thirteen days of the controlled buy, well under the thirty-day threshold established by Florida case law, and was executed within the ten-day statutory requirement, leaving no basis for a staleness challenge.


Headnotes

[1] A search warrant affidavit is not stale if the magistrate issues the warrant within thirty days of the observation of evidence establishing probable cause, absent extraor…

[2] A search warrant must be executed and returned within ten days after issuance.

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Key Quotes

“A warrant must be timely issued by a magistrate and timely executed by law enforcement. Either period can result in staleness.”

Establishes the framework for analyzing staleness claims, requiring separate consideration of issuance and execution timeliness.

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Facts & Procedural History

Police received information on June 10, 1988, that a black male was dealing cocaine from a Tampa residence. A confidential informant, known to be reli…

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Opinion of the Court
ALTENBERND, Judge.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

The state appeals an order that granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at a private dwelling pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court suppressed evidence, including crack cocaine, marijuana, several thousand dollars in U.S. currency, three firearms, and a cellular telephone. The defendant successfully argued that this evidence should be suppressed because the facts set forth in the affidavit in support of the warrant had become “stale” before the warrant was issued. We reverse.

The affidavit attached to the search warrant states that the affiant received information from a detective on June 10, 1988, that a black male was dealing cocaine from a specific residence in Tampa. The affiant officer met with a known and reliable confidential informant, who performed a controlled buy of a small amount of cocaine from an unknown black male between June 10 and June 20, 1988, at the residence. The affiant observed the informant at the front door of this residence during the transaction. The informant told the affiant that the seller had advised him “not to spread the word that you could buy tens and twenties from the residence.” Based on this affidavit, the magistrate issued the warrant on June 23,1988. It was executed eight days later on Friday, July 1, 1988.

A warrant must be timely issued by a magistrate and timely executed by law enforcement. Either period can result in staleness. In this case, there were three to thirteen days between the controlled purchase of cocaine and the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant. There was an additional period of eight days between the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant and its execution by the police. Although these two periods are somewhat interrelated, they should be analyzed separately.

Concerning the timeliness of the issuance of this warrant, the defendant argues, and we assume, that the controlled buy in this case occurred on June 10, 1988. Thus, the evidence of a controlled buy at this residence was only thirteen days old when the magistrate found probable cause to issue the. warrant. The courts of this state have generally refused to invalidate warrants because of “staleness,” in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, if the issuance of the warrant occurs within thirty days of the observation of the evidence establishing probable cause. See Montgomery v. State, 584 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA1991); Sotolongo v. State, 530 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA1988); Hamelmann v. State, 113 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA1959). The period in this case is substantially less than thirty days. There is nothing extraordinary about the facts of this case which would render “stale” the evidence supporting the magistrate’s decision to issue this search warrant. With regard to the timeliness of the execution of the warrant, section 933.-05, Florida Statutes (1987), requires a search warrant to be executed and returned within ten days after issuance. Under normal circumstances, a warrant becomes stale because of delayed execution only if it is not executed within the ten days. Spera v. State, 467 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA1985). This case does not involve a stale warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001)
    …ative to Kopec's testimony, which was admitted. . Ramirez did not raise staleness in his motion to suppress; thus, this claim is barred. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1982). On the merits, we find no error. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 605 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("The courts of this state have generally refused to invalidate warrants because of 'staleness,’ in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, if the issuance of the warrant occurs within thirty days of the observation of th…
  • Pilieci v. State, 991 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …of the circumstances” and a “fair probability” is not designed to result in many bright-line rules. In this case, however, there was much discussion in the trial court of a “thirty-day rule” for determining staleness of evidence. In State v. Lewis, 605 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), this court stated: The courts of this state have generally refused to invalidate warrants because of “staleness,” in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, if the issuance of the warrant occurs within thirty days of the obs…
  • State v. Jones, 110 So. 3d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …generally refused to invalidate warrants because of ‘staleness,’ in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, if the issuance of the warrant occurs within thirty days of the observation of the evidence establishing probable cause.” State v. Lewis, 605 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Ms. Jones’s motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded with directions. VILLANTI and MORRIS, JJ., Concur. . Ms. Jones was…

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