GEORGE W. EAGER AND CALUSA CAMP RESORT, APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA KEYS AQUEDUCT AUTHORITY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1992-08-11
No. 92-222
Before NESBITT, FERGUSON and GODERICH, JJ.
605 So. 2d 883 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellants Eager and Calusa Camp Resort appealed the dismissal of their application for attorney's fees as untimely. The court reversed, finding that the application was timely filed within the statutory and regulatory deadlines when accounting for the five-day mail service extension.


Holding

The application for attorney's fees was timely. Although filed 58 days after the mandate was issued, when combined with the five additional days permitted by Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.002 for mail service, the application was within the 63-day permissible period and should not have been dismissed as untimely.


Headnotes

[1] An application for attorney's fees as a prevailing party must be filed within 60 days of becoming a prevailing party.

[2] When service of an application for attorney's fees is made by mail, five additional days are permitted for filing.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Both section 57.111(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, 1991 and Rule 221-6.035 require a petition for fees to be made within 60 days of a small business becoming a prevailing party. Further, Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.002 provides for five additional days when service is by mail.”

Establishes the applicable legal framework governing the timeliness deadline for attorney's fees applications

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority sought system development fees from appellants in an administrative proceeding. An administrative hearing officer …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

George W. Eager and Calusa Camp Resort appeal the entry of a final order dismissing their application for attorney’s fees as untimely. We reverse the order under review upon our finding that the application was timely filed.

Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority sought system development fees from appellants, George W. Eager and Calusa Camp Resort. Following an administrative hearing, an order was issued in the Authority’s favor. This court reversed that decision and filed an opinion, July 29,1991, finding no system development fees could be collected. Eager v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth., 580 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 591 So. 2d 181 (Fla.1991). Appellants claim the mandate making them the prevailing parties was received by counsel July 30, 1991, and their application for attorney’s fees as the prevailing parties filed September 26, 1991 was therefore timely. The Florida Division of Administrative Hearings acknowledged receipt of the application September 30, 1991. The Division treated the application as a new case and assigned a new case number. Thereafter, the Authority requested dismissal of the application for attorney’s fees as untimely. Subsequently, a hearing officer entered a final order, dismissing the application for attorney’s fees.

Both section 57.111(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, 19911 and Rule 221-6.0352 require a petition for fees to be made within 60 days of a small business becoming a prevailing party.3 Further, Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.0024 provides for five additional days when service is by mail. The motion for fees was made to the agency within sixty-three days after the issuance of this court’s mandate. Considering the additional five days permitted by the Code’s own rule, the fees request should not have been dismissed as untimely.

Accordingly, the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded.

. Section 57.111 (4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1991) provides:

The application for an award of attorney's fees must be made within 60 days after the date that the small business party becomes a prevailing small business party.

. Rule 221-6.035(1) of the Florida Administrative Code provides:

(1) Any small business party asserting entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act shall file a petition for costs and fees with the Division of Administrative Hearings within sixty (60) days after becoming a prevailing small business party within the meaning of the Act.

. Section 57.111(3) provides, in pertinent part:

(c) A small business party is a "prevailing small business party” when:
1. A final judgment or order has been entered in favor of the small business party and such judgment or order has not been reversed on appeal or the time for seeking judicial review of the judgment or order has expired[.]

.Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.002, provides:

Computation of Time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of a Hearing Officer, or by an applicable statute, the date of the act from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.... Five days may be added to prescribed time limits when service is made by mail.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Beacon Fin., Inc. v. Dep't of Ins., 656 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …ent has adopted certain rules of procedure in chapter 4-121, Florida Administrative Code, it has not adopted a specific rule of procedure covering the computation of time and thus, rule 28-5.103 applies. See Eager v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 605 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). . To the extent that we are reversing and remanding for further proceedings as noted above, we need not reach Beacon's fifth point charging that section 627.836(1) is unconstitutional as applied.…
  • State v. S. Beach Pharmacy, Inc., 635 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    ….1958) (“mandate of an appellate tribunal is, of course, directed not to the parties, but to the [lower] court” At 631.) Accord, Tier-ney v. Tierney, 290 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (on reh.). But see Eager v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 605 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). . Entitled "Mandate,” Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340 provides: (a) Issuance of Mandate. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided by these rules, the clerk shall issue such mandate or process as may he direct…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw