GARRISON DUPONT LICKLE, APPELLANT,
v.
DRAGANA N. LICKLE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this divorce modification appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's child support award as an abuse of discretion, finding the husband was ordered to pay an excessive amount ($7,300+ monthly total) when both parents earned substantial incomes and the children spent 40% of their time with him. The court also reversed the attorney's fees award because the trial court violated a pretrial stipulation by determining fee entitlement without a hearing.
The court held that the child support award was an abuse of discretion because it required the husband to pay over 100% of the wife's claimed expenses despite both parties earning substantial incomes and the father caring for the children 40% of the time. The court also held that the trial court erred in making the modification retroactive without crediting the husband for voluntary payments already made and that the trial court violated the binding pretrial stipulation by determining attorney's fees entitlement without a hearing.
[1] A child support award is an abuse of discretion when it obligates one parent to pay one hundred percent of the other parent's expenses for the children, especially when b…
[2] A retroactive child support modification should provide credit for voluntary payments made by the obligor parent for the children's benefit during the proceedings, partic…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under these circumstances, where both the wife and husband earn substantial incomes and the children stay with their father 40% of the time, the husband should not be obligated to pay one hundred per cent of the wife's expenses to support the children, let alone an amount in excess of their needs.”
Establishes the core holding that child support awards must be proportionate to actual need and parental incomes, not a blanket percentage of one parent's expenses.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHusband's net income was $13,000 monthly and wife's was $3,600 monthly. The children spent 40% of their time with the father, including the first ten …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Retroactive Modification cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final judgment modifying a divorce decree. The husband claims several errors. We find merit in his claims that the child support award was an abuse of discretion, that the modification should be retroactive, and that he was not accorded a hearing on attorney’s fee entitlement.
The trial court found that the husband’s net income was $13,000 a month, and the wife’s net income was $3,600 a month.1 The children spend 40% of their time with their father, including the first ten days of each month.
The evidence presented by the wife was that she allocated $3,541 of her expenses to the children. (This figure did not include what was paid by the husband for the children’s benefit but it did include a portion of the mortgage payment, insurance, real estate taxes, furniture purchases, roof repair, gifts, credit card bills, and groceries which included liquor purchases.) The trial court ordered the husband to pay $4,000 per month to the wife. In addition, the husband was also ordered to pay $20,000 annually for private school tuition. Further, the wife’s expert testified that the husband’s direct expenses allocable to the children when they were with him were $2,618 per month. These expenses did not include any pro rata allocation for housing, groceries, etc., as did the wife’s figures, even though the father cares for the children for a substantial portion of each month.
Thus, the effect of the trial court’s order was that the husband spent over $7,300 per month on the children.
Under these circumstances, where both the wife and husband earn substantial incomes and the children stay with their father 40% of the time, the husband should not be obligated to pay one hundred per cent of the wife’s expenses to support the children, let alone an amount in excess of their needs. Even under Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), we hold that this is an abuse of discretion. We do not believe this conflicts with this court’s recent decision of Asrani v. Asrani, 591 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), as the facts of that case were different. We would caution the Bar that an analysis of the Canakaris discretion standard depends upon the particularized facts of each case.
Thus, it is wrong to interpret these cases to create a bright line percentage of income test, an award in excess of which will uniformly be held to be excessive or an award less than a certain percentage will be upheld without question.
On remand the trial court should also reconsider that portion of the order making the child support modification retroactive to the date of filing the petition. It is clear from the evidence that the husband had been making voluntary payments for the children’s benefit throughout the proceedings. At a minimum, he should have been given credit on any retroactive award for such portion of those payments which paid for expenses which the wife now claims as child support.
We also reverse on the issue of attorney’s fees. The parties entered into a pretrial stipulation reserving the issue of entitlement and amount of attorney’s fees and costs to a separate hearing. Nevertheless, the trial court determined entitlement and ordered the husband to pay the wife’s fees. Unless the trial court makes it clear prior to trial that the stipulation to reserve the issue would not be honored, it is binding on the court. See Lotspeich Co. v. Neogard Corp., 416 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). While we would not require the trial court to rehear evidence of the parties’ finances, which were exhaustively revealed at trial, the parties should be accorded a hearing at which they might put on any other evidence regarding entitlement which may be relevant to the issue.
As to the remaining issues, we affirm.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., and FEDER, RICHARD Y., Associate Judge, concur. . The husband disputes these figures, and there is much evidence in his favor. Nevertheless, there was also competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s figures.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Matthews v. Matthews, 677 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…of $4,000 to the mother; the appeals court found the monthly payments (but not the tuition) to be excessive because the father also had "direct expenses allocable to the children when they were with him ... [of] $2,618 per month.” Lickle v. Lickle, 606 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). . The $2,414.08 that the father posits as “the total monthly child support obligation” must be increased by the $340.00 monthly tuition payment the trial court also ordered. All of the health insurance premiums the mother incur…
-
Bathke v. Costley, 332 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023)…ts he paid towards this sum. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the correct amount of attorneys’ fees and costs Mr. Bathke owes after appropriate credit is given for the sums he has already paid. Cf. Lickle v. Lickle, 606 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (holding husband should “[a]t a minimum” be given credit for child support payments he already made). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with instructions. COHEN and MIZE, JJ., concur. Brandon Tyson, of Tys…
-
Bartolotta v. Peggie Bartolotta, 745 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…fidavits or holding a hearing, the court, nevertheless, awarded appellee $4500 in attorney’s fees in the final judgment. Appellant argues that this was error, and we agree. See Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 714, 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Lickle v. Lickle, 606 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand for the court to reconsider this issue following submission of affidavits per the parties’ stipulation. See Krueger v. Krueger, 689 So. 2d 1277, 1279…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Lotspeich Co. v. Neogard Corp., 416 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Asrani v. Ajit Asrani, 591 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)