RALPH C. WARD, JR., APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT

Citator

Cited By

• Viveros v. State, 699 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
  …conveyance. The state maintains that the court’s instruction was not improper because it is not necessary to specifically charge or prove what particular offense was intended to be committed within the structure or conveyance. See Duncan v. State, 606 So. 2d 1227 [*825] (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Likewise, it is not necessary to instruct the jury on the elements of the specific offense upon which the burglary charge is based, i.e., the specific offense which the defendant intended to commit within the structure or…
• Puskac v. State, 735 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
  …e. Viveros v. State, 699 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Although it is not necessary to instruct the jury on the specific offense which the appellant intended to commit within the structure, Viveros, 699 So. 2d at 825 (citing Duncan v. State, 606 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)), it is necessary for the jury to find that appellant entered the premises to commit “an offense” therein. Here, the trial court gave the same instruction as that given in Viveros. In so doing, the trial court improperly instruc…
• Lou Joseph v. State, 965 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
  …at Defendant’s jury acquitted him of count II, committing the shooting offense, did not mean the state failed to prove the intent element of count I, so long as it proved he entered with the intention of committing some offense. See Duncan v. State, 606 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (affirming conviction for attempted burglary of dwelling; prosecution need not specify in the charging document the specific offense intended by the perpetrator, and “proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any t…