ALAN RIMPEL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alan Rimpel, a 15-year-old, appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery, challenging the admissibility of his confession obtained during a nine-hour police interrogation. The court affirms the conviction, holding that under the totality of circumstances, Rimpel's confession was voluntary despite his age and the length of questioning.
The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, concluding that Rimpel's confession was voluntary. Although Rimpel was 15 years old and questioned for approximately nine hours, the totality of circumstances—including that he was not arrested, voluntarily agreed to go to the station, was informed of and waived his rights, was not held incommunicado, had access to parents and counsel, and was questioned by a single officer with breaks—demonstrated voluntariness.
[1] A juvenile's confession is admissible if it is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
[2] The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a juvenile's confession was freely and voluntarily given and that rights were knowingly and…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The admissibility of a juvenile confession depends upon the "totality of circumstances" under which it was made.”
Establishes the governing legal standard for evaluating the admissibility of confessions by juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice arrived at Rimpel's home after receiving information he had shot someone. Rimpel called the police station and agreed to speak with them. He wa…
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GERSTEN, Judge.
Appellant, Alan Rimpel (Rimpel), appeals his conviction and sentence for first degree murder and attempted armed robbery. We affirm.
Detectives went to fifteen-year-old Rim-pel’s home after receiving information that he shot someone. Since Rimpel was not home at the time, he later called the police station and told a detective he would speak to the police. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at Rimpel’s house and asked Rim-pel if he would go to the station to talk about the homicide. Rimpel agreed. Rim-pel’s father was invited to accompany his son, but declined.
Rimpel arrived at the station at about noon, was advised of his constitutional rights, and signed a form waiving those rights. Rimpel was placed in an interrogation room to be questioned by one detective. Throughout the interrogation, the detective left the room several times to speak to other witnesses. Additionally, the detective brought sandwiches and sodas for himself and Rimpel. By 9:30 PM, the intermittent interrogation ended, and Rimpel confessed to shooting the victim.
Rimpel moved to suppress his statement. The trial court denied the motion.
Rimpel contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his confession because Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), dictates that Rimpel’s confession was not voluntary. The State contrarily asserts that the totality of the circumstances indicates that Rimpel’s confession was voluntary.
In Haley, the Supreme Court excluded a confession of a fifteen-year-old defendant who was arrested and interrogated without being informed of his rights. In this case, Rimpel was not arrested. Additionally, he voluntarily agreed to go to the station, where he was informed of, and signed a waiver of, his constitutional rights.
Further, in Haley, the juvenile was held incommunicado for over three days. During this time, the juvenile was denied access to his attorney. Also, the juvenile’s mother was not allowed to see him until five days after the arrest. Contrastingly, here, Rimpel was not denied access to an attorney or his parents.
Lastly, in Haley, the juvenile defendant was questioned constantly by relay teams of one or two police officers. Here, Rimpel was questioned by one officer, who took occasional breaks to interview other witnesses and to get food for Rimpel.
The admissibility of a juvenile confession depends upon the “totality of circumstances” under which it was made. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962); Doerr v. State, 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla.1980); Hall v. State, 421 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), review denied, 430 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1983). The burden is on the State to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily given and that the rights of the accused were knowingly and intelligently waived. Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198 (Fla.1989); McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973).
After examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Rimpel’s confession was voluntary. Although Rimpel was only fifteen years old and was intermittently questioned for approximately nine hours, the other relevant factors demonstrate that the confession was voluntary. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999)…ce, education, background and intelligence,5 in assessing whether the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See S.L.W., 465 So. 2d at 1232 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560); see also Doerr, 383 So. 2d at 907; Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). In conjunction with this age-related inquiry, we also consider the fact that because Ramirez was a juvenile, police were obligated to attempt, and “continue such attempt,” to notify his parents upon taking him into custody.…
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Snipes v. State, 651 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ts. See State v. Sawyer, 561 So .2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The test of voluntariness is determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla.1992); Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review denied, 614 So. 2d 503 (Fla.1993); Sawyer. The “totality of the circumstances” may include police conduct and interrogation techniques used by the police, Sawyer; the duration and nature of the questioning, Thompson; wheth…
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Addison v. State, 653 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…nd was represented by an attorney. After an accused’s right to counsel has been invoked, Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1992) mandates the state must make a clear showing that a defendant initiated such an interview. See also Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), rev. denied, 614 So. 2d 503 (Fla.1993). We agree with the trial court that the state produced clear record evidence that Addison initiated the contact and conversation with Hoard. If this proof turned solely on Hoard’s testimony…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (U.S. 1948)
- Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (U.S. 1962)
- McDOLE v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973)
- Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1989)
- Doerr v. State, 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980)
- Hall v. State, 421 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)