SALVATORE VITIELLO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1992-11-25
No. 91-2033
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and DELL, J., concur.
609 So. 2d 111 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellant Vitiello challenged his guilty plea and sentences on nine counts (eight felonies, one misdemeanor), arguing the plea was involuntary. The court affirmed the judgment, finding the plea was voluntary and knowing, but vacated and remanded the sentences due to multiple errors in the sentencing guidelines scoresheet computation.


Holding

The court held that the guilty plea was voluntary and knowing because the record clearly showed appellant understood the court could sentence within guideline ranges higher than the prosecutor predicted. However, the court vacated the sentences because the scoresheet was scored incorrectly in three material respects that could substantially affect the guideline ranges.


Headnotes

[1] A guilty plea is entered voluntarily and with understanding of the consequences when the defendant acknowledges the court's ability to sentence within the recommended or…

[2] A judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea will be affirmed if the record refutes the claim that the plea was entered without an understanding of the consequences.

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Key Quotes

“appellant acknowledged his understanding that the plea as entered would allow the court to sentence within either the recommended or permitted guideline ranges, even if those ranges were higher than what the prosecutor believed they would be”

Establishes that appellant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary despite his claim otherwise

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant entered an 'open' guilty plea with no definitive sentence agreement, understanding the court could sentence within guideline ranges higher t…

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Opinion of the Court
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge.

OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge.

Appellant seeks review of the judgment and sentences imposed after he pled guilty to a nine count information charging eight felonies and one misdemeanor. We affirm the judgment (as herein modified) against his challenge that the guilty plea upon which the judgment is based was not entered voluntarily and with understanding of the consequences; however, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.

At the plea conference appellant entered what his counsel described as an “open” guilty plea, that is, there was no agreement as to a definitive sentence for any of the offenses, other than that the sentences would be within either the recommended or permitted range of the sentencing guidelines, as reflected on the scoresheet to be computed after the court had been furnished a presentence investigation. The prosecutor expressed the belief that the guidelines, when computed, would show 12 to 17 years as the recommended range and 9 to 22 years as the permitted range. However, in response to the court’s inquiry, appellant acknowledged his understanding that the plea as entered would allow the court to sentence within either the recommended or permitted guideline ranges, even if those ranges were higher than what the prosecutor believed they would be. The record clearly refutes appellant’s claim that his guilty plea was entered without an understanding of the consequences.

At the sentencing hearing the court used a category 9 scoresheet since the primary offenses at conviction were two counts of kidnapping.1 As computed the scoresheet showed a total of 465 points, which produced a recommended guideline sentence of 22 to 27 years. The court, stating that the sentences would be within the recommended guidelines, sentenced appellant to 25 years concurrent on each of the two counts of kidnapping and one count of burglary with a battery, each to be followed by ten years of probation, and 10 years concurrent probation on each of the five counts of sexual battery.2

The problem here is that the scoresheet was scored incorrectly. The two counts of kidnapping, as charged in the information, are first degree felonies punishable by life3 (217 points) but were scored as life felonies (289 points). Appellant’s prior record, which was scored at 34 points, was disputed by appellant but the court did not resolve that dispute (as the court would normally be required to do4) because appellant’s counsel agreed that even were those points eliminated the sentencing cell would remain the same. Finally, the court assessed 40 points for victim injury by following the victim injury schedule in the category 2 scoresheet. Points assessed for victim injury (for either the primary offenses or the additional offenses at conviction) should have been assessed based upon the victim injury schedule on the primary offense scoresheet (in this instance, category 9).5 When the primary offenses at conviction are properly scored at 217 points, together with 102 points assessed for additional offenses at conviction,6 the points that should be properly assessed for victim injury, if any, and the points to be assessed for prior record, if any, become quite significant and could substantially affect the guideline ranges.

The judgment is modified to reflect that Counts II and IV, charging the crime of kidnapping, are each first degree felonies punishable by life rather than life felonies, and as modified is affirmed. The sentences are vacated and this cause is remanded for resentencing consistent with the views herein.

GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and DELL, J., concur. . Rule 3.701(d)(3)(b) Fla.R.Crim.P. . We do not find in the record any sentence imposed for the misdemeanor, possibly an oversight in view of the seriousness of other sentences.

. Section 787.02, Florida Statutes (1991).

. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980); Robbins v. State, 482 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

. Collins v. State, 596 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); State v. Lacy, 553 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

. The total of 102 points appears to be correct. Although 14 points too many were assessed for the single misdemeanor, 14 points too few were assessed for the five second degree felonies.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Wagner v. State, 895 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …Wagner was advised by the trial court that he could receive any sentence up to the maximum sentence allowed by law, and he was advised what the maximum sentences were for each offense to which he pled. We believe the decision in Vitiello v. State, 609 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), is analogous to the instant case and very instructive. In Vitiello, the defendant sought reversal of his conviction and sentence imposed after he pled guilty on the grounds that the plea was not entered voluntarily or with an un…

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