STATE OF FLORIDA AND ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
MICHAEL MANCUSI, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1992-12-16
No. 91-0186
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., POLEN, J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.
609 So. 2d 177 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1992)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that section 768.73(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), is constitutional, reversing the trial court's contrary determination.


Facts & Procedural History

The trial court entered a post-judgment order finding section 768.73(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional. This appeal concerns that order…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We issued our opinion in the companion case regarding Michael Mancusi’s malicious prosecution claim against Alamo Rent-A-Car in Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc. v. Mancu-si, 599 So. 2d 1010 (Fla, 4th DCA 1992). In that case we reversed a final judgment entered in favor of Mancusi and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1013. We also determined that section 768.73(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) did not apply to limit punitive damages that may be awarded on remand. Id.

The instant appeal concerns the trial court’s post judgment order which determined that section 768.73(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court has recently held section 768.73(2)(b) to be constitutional. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla.1992). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order and note that on remand § 768.73(2)(b) would apply.1

REVERSED.

GLICKSTEIN, C.J., POLEN, J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur. . The legislature has amended section 768.-73(2)(b), effective April 8, 1992, to provide:

(b) If the cause of action was based on personal injury or wrongful death, 35 percent of the award is payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund; otherwise, 35 percent of the award is payable to the General Revenue Fund.

(emphasis added).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw