TONY STONE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a habitual offender sentence because the trial judge failed to make all mandatory findings required by statute, including whether prior convictions were pardoned or set aside.
A trial court has a mandatory statutory duty to make all findings required by Section 775.084(1)(a) when sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender, including findings regarding whether prior convictions were pardoned or set aside.
[1] A trial court must make all mandatory findings under Section 775.084(1)(a) when sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender, including findings regarding whether prior…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTony Stone was sentenced as a habitual offender, but the trial judge did not make all the findings required by statute.…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Tony Stone appeals his judgment and sentence as a habitual offender. Appellant Stone argues that in sentencing him as a habitual offender the trial judge did not make the findings required by Section 775.-084, Florida Statutes (1989). We agree. The trial court has a mandatory duty to make all the findings listed in subsection 775.084(l)(a). Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985). We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to make these requisite findings, including whether any prior felony conviction used as a predicate for Stone’s habitual offender classification was pardoned or set aside. See Anderson v. State, 592 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Jones v. State, 606 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As in Anderson, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance:
Does the holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980), that the state has no burden of proof as to whether the convictions necessary for habitual felony offender sentencing have been pardoned or set aside, in that they are ‘affirmative defenses available to [a defendant]’, relieve the trial court of its statutory obligation to make findings regarding those factors, if the defendant does not affirmatively raise, as a defense, that the qualifying convictions provided by the state have been pardoned or set aside?
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MINER and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Stone, 620 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1993)…PER CURIAM. Stone v. State, 610 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), is before the Court for review based on a certified question. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The decision under review is quashed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1993…
Authorities Cited
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Bennie Lee Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1985)
- Anderson v. State, 592 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- William v. Jones, 606 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)