WALTER N. VANCE, III, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MARC FREEMAN, A/K/A MARC H. FREEMAN AND PATSY FREEMAN, A/K/A PATRICIA ANN FREEMAN, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Vance appeals the denial of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, for legal work performed in arbitration proceedings following a construction dispute. The court affirmed, holding that section 713.29 allows attorney's fees only when a party prevails in a judicial action to enforce a mechanic's lien, not when the dispute is resolved through arbitration.
Section 713.29 does not authorize recovery of attorney's fees for arbitration services. Fees are awardable only when a party prevails in a judicial action to enforce a mechanic's lien. A party who files a lien foreclosure but resolves the dispute through arbitration has not "prevailed in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien" and is not entitled to recover attorney's fees from the opposing party.
[1] Attorney's fees are not recoverable under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989), for legal services rendered in arbitration proceedings.
[2] A party who files a mechanic's lien foreclosure action but proceeds to arbitration and obtains an award does not prevail in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien for the…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Fees are not awardable under former section 713.29 unless a party prevails in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that attorney's fees are only available when prevailing in a judicial action, not arbitration.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVance, a contractor, entered into a residential construction contract with the Freemans requiring arbitration of disputes. The Freemans terminated Van…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees In Arbitration cases and more on FLexlaw
SMITH, Judge.
Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. (Vance) appeals an order denying its motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989) for legal representation performed in arbitration proceedings.1 We affirm.
The parties entered into a residential construction contract which required them to arbitrate any disputes. Alleging untimely, defective and nonconforming work, the Freemans terminated Vance in January 1990. Vance recorded a lien against the Freeman’s property and brought a foreclosure action in circuit court. The Free-mans obtained an order staying litigation and compelling arbitration of all contract disputes. As a result of the ensuing arbitration, Vance was awarded $39,427.23 plus interest, which the Freemans immediately paid. Thereafter, Vance filed a motion in circuit court seeking attorney’s fees and costs for time spent in arbitration, which was denied. This appeal followed.
It is true that fees can be recovered for representation in arbitration proceedings compelled in insurance disputes relative to certain provisions of the Insurance Code, such as sections 627.428 and 627.756, Florida Statutes. Insurance Co. of North America v. Acousti Engineering Construction Co., 579 So. 2d 77 (Fla.1991) approving Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co., 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We have not overlooked appellant’s contention that the policy arguments underlying the award of fees in the cited cases should apply equally in this case. However, as the trial court found, section 713.29 cannot be compared with sections 627.428 and 627.756. Fees are not awardable under former section 713.29 unless a party prevails in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien. A party who files a mechanic’s lien foreclosure, but then goes to arbitration and receives an award by that means, has not “prevailed in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien” and is not entitled to have his attorney’s fees paid by the opposing party. Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condominium Association, Inc., 534 So. 2d 739, 742-3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS and KAHN, JJ., concur. . Section 713.29 was amended effective January 1, 1991 to include payment for services during arbitration. The underlying action in this case was instituted prior to January 1, 1991 and the trial court correctly determined that the amended section 713.29 did not control.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Suitt Constr. Co., Inc. v. 147 Assocs., 611 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Vance v. Freeman, 610 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Freedman v. Collier Commercial Builders, Inc., 596 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Beach Resorts Int’l v. Clarmac Marine Constr. Co., 339 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); § 713.29, Fla.Stat. (1989).…
Authorities Cited
- Fewox v. McMERIT Constr. Co., 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Ins. Co. OF N. Am. v. Acousti Eng'g Co. OF Fla., 579 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1991)
- ZAC Smith & Co., Inc. v. Moonspinner Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 534 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)