RAY B. HELLMANN, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ray Hellmann appeals the denial of attorney's fees after winning a jury verdict for $36,000 in a personal injury case stemming from a car accident with a City of Orlando street sweeper. The court reversed, holding that an offer of judgment under Florida law is valid even if costs are requested without a specific dollar amount, entitling the plaintiff to attorney's fees when the final judgment exceeds the offer by more than 25%.
The court held that an offer of judgment is valid and sufficient even when costs are requested without a specific dollar amount, and therefore attorney's fees must be awarded when the final judgment exceeds the offer by at least 25%.
[1] An offer of judgment made pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, is not invalidated by the failure to state a specific dollar amount for requested costs.
[2] The term "judgment obtained" in section 768.79, Florida Statutes, refers to the amount of damages awarded by a jury and does not include taxable costs.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment.”
Establishes the statutory language governing interpretation of offers of judgment under section 768.79
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHellmann's car was struck by a City of Orlando street sweeper. He made an offer/demand for judgment of $8,500 plus costs (without specifying a dollar …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Taxable Costs cases and more on FLexlaw
[*104] HARRIS, Judge.
Ray B. Heilman timely appeals because he was not awarded attorney’s fees in his final judgment.
Heilman’s car was struck by a City of Orlando street sweeper. He made an offer/demand for judgment in the amount of $8,500.00 plus costs under Rule 1.442, Fla. R.Civ.P. and section 768.79, Florida Statutes which was denied. A jury trial was subsequently conducted and a verdict was entered in favor of Heilman in the amount of $36,000. He then filed a motion to tax costs and for attorney’s fees and requested judgment on the verdict. The trial court, finding that the earlier offer of judgment was invalid since it included a request for costs which was not specific as to a dollar amount, denied the motion for attorney’s fees and entered a judgment in the amount of $36,000.00 plus costs in the amount of $2,604.32.
The issue before us is whether an offer/demand for judgment is ineffective if costs are requested but not stated in a specific dollar amount. We find the demand was sufficient and reverse the denial of attorney’s fees.
Section 768.79 provides:
(2) The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer. An offer must:
(a) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this section.
(b) Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being made.
(c) State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for punitive damage, if any.
(d) State its total amount.
The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment. [Emphasis added.]
In Williams v. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), this court considered whether section 768.79 which provides that a defendant who has made an offer of judgment may recover costs and attorney fees if the judgment obtained is at least 25% less than the offer includes in the definition of “judgment obtained” taxable costs or attorney fees provided by statutes and rules which are taxable by the court incidental to the jury’s consideration of an award for damages. The defendant in Williams argued that because the Offer of Judgment did not indicate that the $2,000 offer was not inclusive of costs and because offers should be strictly construed against the offeror, the Offer of Judgment must be understood to be inclusive of costs. This court declined to accept the defendant’s interpretation of the statute, holding:
[T]hat the statutory term “judgment obtained” means the amount of the judgment for damages awarded by the jury for the cause of action being tried and does not include taxable costs or attorney’s fees provided by statutes and rules which are taxable by the court incidental to the jury’s consideration of an award for damages. Perhaps the difference is between the concept of an offer to settle as opposed to the concept of an “offer of judgment.” An offer to settle would be more inclusive resolving all matters for one stated sum whereas a plaintiff, accepting an Offer of Judgment (for damage claims) would still be entitled to an award of taxable costs under section 57.-041, Florida Statutes.
Id. at 493.
Section 768.79 states that an offer should be construed as including all damages “which may be awarded in a final judgment.” We held in Williams that the “judgment obtained” language in the statute does not include taxable costs which are incidental to a jury’s consideration of a damage award; therefore, we now hold that the failure to state claimed cost in a dollar amount does not invalidate an otherwise valid offer of judgment.
REVERSED and REMANDED for the imposition of a reasonable attorney’s fee.
COWART, J., and JOHNSTON, L.V., III, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
White v. Steak & ALE OF Fla., Inc., 816 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2002)…orney’s fees. This was error, as a plaintiff need not include taxable costs or attorney’s fees otherwise provided by statute and rule that the court would tax against a defendant incidental to the jury’s damage award.”); Hellmann v. City of Orlando, 610 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (“[T]he failure to state claimed cost in a dollar amount does not invalidate an otherwise valid offer of judgment.”). Just as it would “be inherently unfair to force the plaintiff to include costs in his demand for judgment…
-
Mincin v. Short, 662 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…oper addition of taxable costs to the jury’s award in determining the amount of the “judgment obtained” by Mincin. In doing so, we also reject Minein’s argument that Short made costs an integral element of her offer. See Hellmann v. City of Orlando, 610 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Stewart v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 595 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We also conclude that Mincin was not entitled to taxable costs incurred after Short filed her offer of judgment. In Goode v. Udhwani, 648 So. 2d 247…
-
MGR Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Wilson ICE Enters., Inc., 706 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…s encompassing “all damages which might be awarded in the final judgment.” § 768.79(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Security Professionals, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 700 So. 2d 687 (Fla.1997); Hellmann v. City of Orlando, 610 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). MGR argues that Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Silverman, 689 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), where the Third District court held an offer invalid because it did not mention the counterclaim, mandates a contrary result. Howe…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rondoe Marie Williams v. Jeannine O. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)