STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD JEROME OATES, APPELLEE
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Florida's appellate court reversed Richard Oates' sentencing, holding that the trial court improperly withheld adjudication of guilt while imposing a two-year prison sentence. The court explained that adjudication cannot be withheld when a defendant is incarcerated, except under limited circumstances in the Youthful Offender Act that do not apply here.
The trial court erred in withholding adjudication while imposing incarceration. As a general rule, adjudication cannot be withheld if a defendant is incarcerated, except under the Youthful Offender Act when incarceration is a condition of probation not exceeding 364 days. Here, the court's orders committed Oates to two years of incarceration, exceeding the statutory limit even if viewed as a condition of probation.
[1] Adjudication of guilt cannot generally be withheld when a defendant is incarcerated.
[2] Under the Youthful Offender Act, adjudication may be withheld if incarceration is a condition of probation and does not exceed 364 days.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As a general rule, adjudication cannot be withheld if a defendant is incarcerated.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that adjudication and incarceration are generally incompatible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOates pled nolo contendere to sexual battery as a youthful offender. The trial judge stated at sentencing that she intended to place Oates in a boot c…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
The state argues that the court improperly sentenced Oates to serve two years in prison without adjudicating him guilty. Although this is not what the trial court intended to do, this was the practical effect of the orders sentencing Oates. As such, the sentencing was improper. As a general rule, adjudication cannot be withheld if a defendant is incarcerated. State v. Green, 581 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA1991); State v. Scarantino, 543 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA1989); State v. Seward, 543 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA1989); Thomas v. State, 356 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla.1978); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.670. However, adjudication can be withheld under the Youthful Offender Act if the incarceration is a condition of probation and the term of incarceration does not exceed 364 days. § 958.04(2)(a) and (b), Fla.Stat. (1989). The issue here is whether the court imposed a sentence of incarceration or merely imposed incarceration as a condition of probation.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated her intent to place Oates in the boot camp program with the provision that if he did not successfully complete the program, he would be incarcerated for two years. If he did complete the program, however, he was to be on community control for four years. The judge explained that if Oates failed to complete the boot camp program, she would adjudicate him then.
The court’s orders do not reflect the judge’s stated intent at sentencing, however. According to the sentencing order, Oates pled nolo to sexual battery, a lesser and included offense (§ 794.011, Fla.Stat. (1989)), and was sentenced as a youthful offender pursuant to section 958.05, Florida Statutes (1989) (Youthful Offender Act). Adjudication was withheld. The sentencing order recited that Oates was committed to the custody of the DOC for two years, followed by four years on youthful offender community control. The court recommended boot camp and basic training, stating: “See attached youthful offender order.”
The youthful offender order stated that adjudication was withheld and that Oates would be incarcerated for two years with the DOC. Additionally, Oates would be screened by HRS for inclusion in the Boot Camp/Basic Training Program. Following incarceration or successful completion of the basic training program, Oates would serve four years of community control under the supervision of the DOC. The court specifically listed special conditions of community control, none of which involved boot camp.
Under this scheme, Oates was to be committed to the custody of the DOC and was to be screened for inclusion in the boot camp program. It was not certain, however, that he would be accepted into that program. If he was not, he would be incarcerated for two years, to be followed by four years community control.
Although Oates argues that the incarceration was merely a term or condition of community control, we believe that the trial court’s orders provide otherwise. Both the sentencing order and the youthful offender order specifically commit Oates to the DOC. Although Oates is then to be screened for acceptance into the boot camp program, if he is not accepted, he will serve two years incarceration.
These facts lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the court’s orders did, in fact, sentence Oates to a term of incarceration. As such, the court erred in failing to adjudicate Oates guilty.
Even if, as Oates argues, the incarceration was ordered as a term or condition of probation, the incarceration exceeded the term allowed by law. Section 948.-04(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that any incarceration ordered as a condition of probation or community control shall not exceed 364 days. The period of incarceration here, two years, exceeded that statutory maximum.
Having concluded that the court improperly ordered Oates incarcerated without adjudicating him guilty, we vacate Oates’ sentences and remand with instructions that, upon adjudication of guilt, Oates may again be sentenced to incarceration or, alternatively, the court may decline to adjudicate Oates guilty and sentence him to a term of incarceration as a condition of probation so long as the incarcerative portion does not exceed 364 days.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Johnston v. Hudlett, 32 So. 3d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…er pleaded below. Moreover, the defenses of the statute of limitations and statute of repose are being raised for the first time on appeal, and therefore were not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 610 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“In this case, the appellant did not raise the Statute of Repose before the trial court in a timely manner. Accordingly, the applicability of the Statute of Repose to this case was not preserved for our review.”). Appellants arg…
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State v. Butler, 719 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…(2)(b) allows incarceration as a condition of probation or community control, as here, in a community or county facility or in a probation or restitution center, but limits the term of such incarceration to np more than 364 days. In State v. Oates, 610 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the court held that a sentence functionally indistinguishable from the sentence in this case was improper and unauthorized by the statute under which it was imposed. There as here, the court imposed incarceration under the YOS as…
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State v. Cleveland Davis, 721 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…der with one year and one day in the Florida State Prison to be followed by two years probation, to run concurrently with credit for time served. As a general rule, adjudication cannot be withheld if a defendant is incarcerated. See State v. Oates, 610 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). However, adjudication can be withheld under the Youthful Offender Act if the incarceration is a condition of probation and the term of incarceration does not exceed 364 days. See id.; § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). [*1244] Th…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thomas v. State, 356 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- State v. Scarantino, 543 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- State v. Seward, 543 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Tyler v. State, 581 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- State v. Green, 581 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)