TIMOTHY FREEMAN, DANI ENIX, CHRISTOPHER GORDON, MARY R. KINKLE, DENISE LINDEMANN, JEANETTE MCMORRIS, DAVID NEASON, JIM ONITVEROS, DAVID RABASSI, DAVID A. ROSE AND GARY ESPEY, PETITIONERS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Petitioners convicted of driving under the influence challenged the suspension of their driving privileges as constituting double punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that license suspension is an administrative remedy for public protection, not punishment, and therefore does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The license suspension is an administrative remedy for public protection rather than punishment, and therefore does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The suspension can be imposed alongside criminal DUI prosecution without constituting impermissible double punishment.
[1] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.
[2] A civil penalty may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes if it is not rationally related to compensating the government for its actual loss.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause precludes multiple punishments for the same offense.”
Establishes the applicable constitutional standard for the petitioners' challenge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEach petitioner was stopped for suspected driving under the influence, submitted to a breathalyzer test showing blood alcohol exceeding 0.10%, and was…
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PER CURIAM.
The petitioners have filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the denial of their appeal by the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the denial of the petitioners’ motions to dismiss their driving under the influence convictions on double jeopardy grounds. We deny the petition.
Each of the petitioners was stopped by law enforcement officers for driving under the influence of alcohol, each submitted to a breathalyzer test, and the blood alcohol of each was at a level exceeding .10%. The petitioners were charged with Driving Under the Influence and also had their drivers license seized by their arresting officer pursuant to section 322.2615, Florida Statutes (1991).
Motions to dismiss were filed in county court by the petitioners in which they argued that the suspension of their driving privileges for the same conduct alleged in the criminal charges for driving under the influence violates the constitutional prohibition against double punishment. The county court denied the petitioners’ motions to suppress, and on appeal the circuit court affirmed.
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause precludes multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Relying on Halper, the petitioners argued that the purpose of the roadside license suspension is punitive and so jeopardy attached before the state prosecuted the criminal charges of driving under the influence.
In Halper, the Supreme Court addressed under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court held that in order to uphold the civil sanction as remedial the sanction had to bear a rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its actual loss.
A driver’s license suspension for refusal to take a chemical test is not remedial in the sense meant by the Halper decision. See Ellis v. Pierce, 230 Cal.App.3d 1557, 282 Cal.Rptr. 93 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 1991). However, neither is it punitive. In Florida, it is clear that the purpose of the statute providing for revocation of a driver’s license upon conviction of a licensee for driving while intoxicated is to provide an administrative remedy for public protection and not for punishment of the offender. Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105 (Fla.1957).
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court correctly applied Smith v. City of Gainesville and did not depart from the essential requirements of law. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…we agree with our companion courts that double jeopardy is not violated when a person has their driver’s license suspended pursuant to section 322.2615, Florida Statutes (1991), and is subsequently brought to trial on a DUI charge. Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), rev. denied, 623 So. 2d 493 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 415, 126 L.Ed.2d 361 (1993); Gomez v. State, 621 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Because the primary purpose of section 322.2615 is to provide an administrative…
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Davidson v. MacKINNON, 656 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…§ 322.2615); Gomez v. State, 621 So. 2d 578 (Fla.3d DCA 1993) (no double jeopardy violation is involved in the prosecution of a DUI charge after a driver’s license has been seized under F.S. § 322.2615 because of the same conduct); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla.2d DCA 1992), rev. denied, 623 So. 2d 493 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 415, 126 L.Ed.2d 361 (1993) (revocation of driver’s license upon conviction for DUI does not preclude DUI prosecution). All of these cases rely on the principle…
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Eyvor A. Gomez v. State, 621 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. We entirely agree with the trial court and Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), that no double jeopardy violation is involved in the prosecution of a D.U.I. charge after the defendant’s driver’s license has been seized, because of the same conduct, by the arresting officer pursuant to section 322.2615, Flori…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (U.S. 1989)
- Smith v. City OF Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957)