BILL SPRAGUE, APPELLANT,
v.
P.I.A. OF SARASOTA, INC., A/K/A P.I.A. SARASOTA PALMS, INC., D/B/A SARASOTA PALMS HOSPITAL, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1993-01-13
No. 91-03534
DANAHY, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
611 So. 2d 1336 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bill Sprague appealed a summary judgment entered against him in a wrongful discharge case. The court reversed and vacated the judgment because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the summary judgment motion after Sprague filed a notice of voluntary dismissal the day before the hearing.


Holding

The trial court erred by entering any order after the notice of voluntary dismissal was filed. A plaintiff has the power to dismiss an action by serving a notice of dismissal before a hearing on a summary judgment motion, and such dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction to enter any subsequent order. The defendant's argument regarding counsel's authority does not diminish the plaintiff's right to dismiss or prevent the voluntary dismissal from being effective.


Headnotes

[1] A plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action at any time before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.

[2] A timely filed notice of voluntary dismissal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on pending motions.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) endows a plaintiff with the power to abort his lawsuit by serving 'a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment.' No further action is required.”

Establishes the plaintiff's unilateral right to dismiss before a summary judgment hearing under Florida procedural rules

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Sprague filed a wrongful discharge action against his former employer P.I.A. of Sarasota on October 20, 1989. P.I.A. moved for summary judgment on Aug…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
FRANK, Judge.

FRANK, Judge.

Bill Sprague appeals from the final summary judgment granted P.I.A. of Sarasota and we reverse for the reason that the action was voluntarily dismissed prior to the trial court hearing the motion.

On October 20, 1989, Bill Sprague filed an action for wrongful discharge against his former employer, P.I.A. It moved for summary judgment on August 28, 1991, and a hearing was scheduled for September 26, 1991. On September 25,1991, Sprague, through his counsel, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. A copy of the notice was hand delivered to counsel for P.I.A. on the same date. Although divested of jurisdiction to rule on the summary judgment motion, the trial court nevertheless entered final summary judgment on September 26, 1991.

Sprague contends, and we agree, that it was error for the trial court to take any action subsequent to the filing of the notice of voluntary dismissal. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) endows a plaintiff with the power to abort his lawsuit by serving “a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment.” No further action is required. The effect of a voluntary dismissal is “to remove completely from the court’s consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of ‘jurisdiction’.” Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla.1978).

P.I.A. concedes it received the notice of voluntary dismissal, but urges that Roger Fishell, Sprague’s attorney, had withdrawn from the case and, thus, no longer had the authority to act upon his client’s behalf. P.I.A. asserts that because Isidore Kirshenbaum, an attorney with whom Fishell was allegedly associated, withdrew from the representation on Sep tember 19, 1991, the dismissal filed by Fi-shell, who did not file a separate appearance, did not achieve that result. The notion is unpersuasive. Subsequent to Kir-shenbaum’s withdrawal, P.I.A. served papers in support of summary judgment on “Roger Fischel [sic], Esq., attorney for Plaintiff”. Obviously P.I.A. regarded Fished as counsel of record following Kirshenbaum’s withdrawal. In any event, we fail to perceive how Fishell’s status in this matter in any degree either diminishes Sprague’s right to dismiss his action or arms P.I.A. with the ability to argue against the effect of the voluntary notice.

Accordingly, the final summary judgment is vacated and the action is dismissed.

DANAHY, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …, equivalent in all [*1299] respects to a deprivation of ‘jurisdiction.’” As a consequence, “the trial judge loses the ability to exercise judicial discretion or to adjudicate the cause in any way....” Id. Accord Sprague v. P.I.A. of Sarasota, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We conclude, therefore, that the joint stipulation for dismissal filed by Cooper and his insurance company in the uninsured motorist lawsuit under rule 1.420(a) divested the trial court of any subject matter jurisdiction to adjud…
  • Kevin v. Brown, 884 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …l to the circuit court, the county court’s order was affirmed by order of the circuit court, dated July 28, 1999. The circuit court, citing Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1978), and Sprague v. P.I.A. of Sarasota, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), stated that by voluntarily dismissing his case, Brown deprived the county court of any jurisdiction over it, and there was no pending case in which the county or circuit courts could enter an order. The circuit court further stat…
  • Durie v. Hanson, 691 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw