JOAN DOWNING LAWHON, PETITIONER,
v.
ROGER MASON AND MARIE MASON, AS NATURAL PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF JOHN PAUL MASON, A MINOR; AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENTS
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Joan Lawhon, a defendant in an automobile negligence action, challenged a prejudgment order prohibiting her from transferring assets without notice to the plaintiffs. The Florida appellate court granted her petition for certiorari, finding the trial court lacked authority to issue such an order without proper statutory basis or showing of entitlement to injunctive relief.
The court held that the trial court's order was unauthorized. An injunction cannot be used to enforce money damages or prevent asset disposal prior to conclusion of an action at law, and the order had the effect of a prejudgment writ of attachment without satisfying statutory requirements. While tort claimants may be entitled to enjoin fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, respondents had not filed suit under that statute.
[1] An injunction cannot be used to prevent a party from disposing of assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law.
[2] A prejudgment writ of attachment cannot issue without satisfying statutory requirements, including a debt due and a sworn allegation of property removal or disposal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An injunction cannot be used to enforce money damages or prevent a party from disposing of assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law.”
Establishes the foundational principle that the trial court's injunctive order was improper as a matter of law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLawhon was the defendant in an automobile negligence case. After she requested a continuance, the respondents (plaintiffs) filed a motion to prohibit …
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PER CURIAM.
Joan Lawhon seeks a writ of certiorari to review a prejudgment order entered by the circuit court in connection with an ongoing automobile negligence action. We find no authority for the order under review, and grant the petition.
Lawhon is the defendant below. Shortly after her request for continuance was granted, respondents filed a “motion to prohibit defendant from transferring assets.” The motion cited the extensive injuries suffered in the accident, a perceived lack of sufficient insurance coverage, the belief that Lawhon has “substantial assets” that would be subject to execution in the event of a plaintiffs’ verdict, and the fact Lawhon “had hired personal counsel skilled in the area of execution of judgments.” Respondents’ counsel expressed his “concern” that Lawhon might be prepared to dissipate or conceal assets, though he admitted she had not attempted to do so up to that point.
The trial court’s order requires that Lawhon give plaintiffs ten days notice prior to the transfer of any assets in excess of $500. The order has the effect of a series of temporary injunctions, without the necessary showing of entitlement to injunctive relief. An injunction cannot be used to enforce money damages or prevent a party from disposing of assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law. Hiles v. Auto Bahn Federation, Inc., 498 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA1986); Action Electric & Repair, Inc. v. Batelli, 416 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA1981). The order also bears aspects of a prejudgment writ of attachment, without requiring respondents to satisfy the statutory requirements for same. A writ of attachment cannot issue unless there is a debt due or an existing debt not yet due. There must also be a verified complaint or sworn allegation that the defendant is removing or disposing of property. Hearsay or “subjective belief” will not suffice. Hordis Bros., Inc. v. Sentinel Holdings, Inc., 562 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA1990).
Respondents contend that a tort claimant may be entitled to enjoin fraudulent transfers of assets even though the claim is contingent and not yet reduced to judgment. Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA1991). While this may be so, respondents have yet to file suit under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Thus Lawhon appropriately describes their approach as “attempting to ‘piggyback’ the discovery process of an unfiled Chapter 726 lawsuit onto a simple negligence claim.”
The petition for certiorari is granted, the order under review is quashed, and this case is remanded to circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RYDER, A.C.J., and HALL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Rappaport v. Mercantile Bank, 17 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…alleged a claim under the UFTA, nor has it added the putative fraudulent transferee as a defendant in the pending action. Thus the Bank’s reliance on the supreme court’s decision in Friedman is unavailing. This court’s decision in Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), is pertinent to the Bank’s argument. In La-whon, the plaintiffs in a personal injury case moved for a prejudgment order to prohibit the defendant — who was allegedly underinsured — from transferring assets. Id. at 1368. The trial…
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Sylvio Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…rce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1980). This case is unlike those cases where a party seeks to enjoin the transfer of assets prior to obtaining a judgment. See, e.g., Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Diamond v. Interstate Trading Corp., 606 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); De Leon v. Aerochago, S.A., 593 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Here, the husband had a final money judgment, and had alleged that the wife had already made t…
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BRICEÑO v. Bryden Invs., Ltd., 973 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…injunctive relief alleges that the opposing party may dissipate bank assets, a judgment for money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is improper, notwithstanding the possibility that a money judgment will be uncollectible."); Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ("An injunction cannot be used to enforce money damages or prevent a party from disposing of assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law."); Kon [*617] over Realty Assocs., Ltd. v. Mladen, 511 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed'n, Inc., 498 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Action Elec. & Repair, Inc. v. Batelli, 416 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Hordis Bros., Inc. v. Sentinel Holdings, Inc., 562 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)