PRESTIGE DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD L. RUSSELL AND DEBRA L. RUSSELL, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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Prestige Development Group appealed a trial court judgment in a construction contract dispute involving roof repairs on the Russells' home. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the Russells failed to prove Prestige breached the contract and that the trial court erred in dismissing Prestige's mechanic's lien claim.
The evidence did not demonstrate a breach of contract by Prestige because the Russells failed to prove their damages were caused by any breach of the contract. The trial court erred in dismissing Prestige's mechanic's lien claim because the Russells waived the condition precedent regarding the contractor's affidavit by failing to raise it with specificity and particularity as required.
[1] A plaintiff in a contract dispute bears the burden of proving that damages were caused by a breach of the contract.
[2] A defendant waives the requirement of a contractor's affidavit for a mechanic's lien claim if the condition precedent is not raised with particularity before the close of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The burden is on the plaintiff in a contract dispute to prove that his damages were caused by a breach of the contract.”
Establishes the standard of proof required to prevail in breach of contract cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrestige contracted with Donald and Debra Russell to repair and replace a leaky roof by installing bitu-thene roofing materials according to manufactu…
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ALLEN, Judge.
Prestige Development Group, Inc. (Prestige) appeals from a final judgment in a suit in which it sought damages for breach of a construction contract and foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien. In that same suit, Donald and Debra Russell, the appellees, successfully counterclaimed for damages, alleging that Prestige had breached the same contract. Although Prestige raises various issues, only two have merit. We conclude (1) that the evidence at trial did not demonstrate a breach of the contract by Prestige, and (2) that the trial court erred in dismissing Prestige’s mechanic’s lien claim.
Prestige contracted to repair and replace a leaky roof on the Russell’s newly constructed house. According to the contract, Prestige agreed to "[ijnstall bitu-thene roofing materials according to manufacturer’s specifications.” The contract contained no warranties or guarantees that this roofing material would not leak. Although it is undisputed that the roof does leak, there was no evidence at trial that leaks were caused by Prestige’s failure to install the roofing materials according to the manufacturer’s specifications. The burden is on the plaintiff in a contract dispute to prove that his damages were caused by a breach of the contract. Knowles v. C.I.T. Corp., 346 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Because the Russells failed to offer any evidence that their damages were caused by any breach by Prestige of the contract, we must reverse the judgment in favor of the Russells.
Prestige also alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing its mechanic’s lien claim for failing to prove service of the contractor’s affidavit provided for in section 713.06(3)(d)(l), Florida Statutes.
We agree. The supreme court in Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1991), held that the defendant’s failure to plead which condition precedent had not been met “specifically and with particularity” resulted in a waiver of the condition. In this case, Prestige had alleged in its complaint that all conditions precedent under chapter 713 had been satisfied. Although the Russells made a general denial of that allegation, they never raised the issue of the contractor’s affidavit until after the close of evidence.
Therefore, the Russells waived compliance with that condition, and the trial court erred in dismissing Prestige’s mechanic’s lien claim on this basis. See Ingersoll; Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Construction Co., 546 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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City OF Coconut Creek v. City OF Deerfield Beach, 840 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…present here. See Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla.1991); Menendez v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 537 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla.1988); City of Pembroke Pines v. Atlas, 474 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Prestige Dev. Group, Inc. v. Russell, 612 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In summary, Coconut Creek’s consistency challenge fails because it exists solely as a creature of statute; Coconut Creek never complied with a statutory condition precedent; the time for complying with the condition has ex…
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T.L. Paulk v. Peyton, 648 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…eld that pleading the defense of failure to give the contractor’s affidavit is not accomphshed by simply denying the allegation that “ah [*774] conditions precedent under Chapter 713 have been satisfied.” Prestige Development Group, Inc. v. Russell, 612 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In the case sub judice, Paulk alleged compliance with section 713.06(3)(d), as well as satisfaction of all conditions precedent. As such, it was incumbent upon Pey-ton, under rule 1.120(c), to plead specifically and with p…
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Lonnie D. Adams Bldg. Contractor, Inc. v. O'Connor, 714 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…suited for the purposes for which they were intended.” 552 So. 2d at 232, Lochrane does not hold that a construction contract impliedly promises that any products the contractor uses will be free of defects. Cf. Prestige Dev. Group, Inc. v. Russell, 612 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that where roofer agreed to install roofing materials according to manufacturer’s specifications, and where no evidence established an express warranty that roof would not leak, or poor workmanship, plaintiff failed to p…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ingersoll v. Warren Hoffman, D.D.S., 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1991)
- Knowles v. C. I. T. Corp., 346 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)