KAREN CARAZO, MICHAEL ZAPETIS, AND FIRST INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATUS SHIPPING, LTD., AND VINCENT DISIMONE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellants challenged a default judgment entered against them for failing to file an answer after their counsel missed a case management conference and new counsel filed a motion to dismiss instead. The appellate court reversed, finding that the default sanction was disproportionate to the procedural violations and that appellants deserved an opportunity to respond before severe sanctions were imposed.
The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the default sanction because it was disproportionate to the procedural violations and appellants were not given an opportunity to respond before severe sanctions were imposed. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the motion to dismiss.
[1] A default judgment is an extreme sanction that should not be imposed absent a showing of flagrant, persistent, willful, or otherwise aggravated violation of court orders.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by imposing a sanction that is not commensurate with the offense.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 permits the court, on failure of a party to attend a case management or pretrial conference, to dismiss the action, strike the pleadings, limit proof or witnesses, or take any other appropriate action, the sanction imposed must be commensurate with the offense.”
Establishes the governing standard for sanctions under Florida procedure—that sanctions must be proportionate to the violation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees filed suit alleging appellants failed to pay a promissory note. Appellants filed timely motions to dismiss, which were followed by an amende…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sanctions For Procedural Violations cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellants, Karen Carazo, Michael Zapetis, and First International Finance Corp., challenge the trial court’s order refusing to set aside a default entered against them. We reverse.
The appellees, Status Shipping, Ltd. and Vincent Disimone, filed an action alleging that appellants failed to pay a promissory note when due. In response, the appellants filed a timely motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellees subsequently filed an amended complaint to include a count for replevin. Again, the appellants filed a timely motion to dismiss the amended complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, and the appellees’ lack of legal capacity to bring an action in the state of Florida.
On February 18, 1992, the appellants’ counsel failed to appear at the case management conference scheduled by the trial court. As a result, the trial court entered an order on March 3, 1992, striking the appellants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and ordering the appellants to file an answer to the amended complaint within ten days of the order. The order provided that if an answer was not filed in ten days, a default would be entered against the appellants. The appellants immediately retained new counsel, who, rather than filing an answer as ordered by the trial court, filed a second motion to dismiss the. amended complaint on March 13, 1992, within the ten day period. Based on the trial court’s order of March 3, 1992, the appellees filed a motion for default on April 14; 1992, which was granted without a hearing on April 29, 1992. Unaware that the court had already entered a default, the appellants filed a response to the motion for default on May 5, 1992, asserting that the filing of the second motion to dismiss was necessary to preserve the appellants’ objections to the amended complaint. The motion to dismiss did raise legitimate issues and was not filed for the purpose of delay. The trial court construed the response as a motion to set aside the default and denied the same. This timely appeal followed.
We find that the facts of this case do not warrant the extreme sanction of a default. While Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 permits the court, on failure of a party to attend a case management or pretrial conference, to dismiss the action, strike the pleadings, limit proof or witnesses, or take any other appropriate action, the sanction imposed must be commensurate with the offense. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 357 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). In this case, counsel’s failure to attend the case management conference did not warrant striking the appellants’ motion to dismiss. See Paris Int’l Records & Filmworkers, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 539 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Aller v. Editorial Planeta, S.A., 389 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Likewise, the new counsel’s decision to file a motion to dismiss in violation of the court’s order rather than requesting leave to do so did not warrant the extreme sanction of a default. Although we do not condone the attorneys’ behavior in these instances, their actions or inactions should not serve to punish the litigants so severely given the facts of this case. See Beasley v. Girten, 61 So. 2d 179 (Fla.1952).
In the order refusing to set aside the default, the trial court stated that the appellants’ motions were not set for hearing, no one appeared for appellants at the case management conference, and an answer was not filed within the time period ordered by the court. The trial court also noted that appellants changed attorneys. It appears that neither the appellants nor their attorneys were given the opportunity to respond to the violations before sanctions were imposed. Based on the record before us, there is no showing of a flagrant, persistent, willful, or otherwise aggravated violation, and therefore, the severe sanction of default is not warranted in this case. See Insua v. World Wide Air, Inc., 582 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We, accordingly, find that the trial court abused its discretion. We reverse the order refusing to set aside the default and remand with instructions for the trial court to reinstate the appellants’ second motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Zeigler v. Huston, 626 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…and not under rule 1.500(b). A finding that the party’s conduct was willful and contumacious is necessary for entering a default under rule 1.200(c). See [*1048] Kelley v. Schmidt, 613 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Carozo v. Status Shipping, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). It is difficult to conceive how a finding of willfulness or deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority can be made when that party is without notice of the court orders requiring his presence. Under either ru…
-
Barnett v. Barnett, 718 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…aled the sanction either at the time it was entered, or at the time of the final judgment. To obtain reversal of the order on appeal, Mr. Barnett would have had to establish that Judge Luce abused his discretion. See Carazo v. Status Shipping, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). He cannot now challenge the correctness of the court’s ruling by way of a motion, to set aside the judgment. See Sacco v. Slavin, 641 So. 2d 955, 956-957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (noting that gist of defendant’s argument on motio…
-
Walter H.C. Drakeford v. Barnett Bank OF Tampa, 694 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…failure to attend a case management conference pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(e), the sanction must be commensurate with the offense. See Clark v. Sturks, 668 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Carazo v. Status Shipping, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Insua v. World Wide Air, Inc., 582 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The striking of a party’s pleadings resulting in a dismissal or a default is the most severe sanction and it should be used “sparingly and reserved to t…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Beasley v. Girten, 61 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952)
- Travelers Ins. Co. & Peter Vassey v. Rodriguez, 357 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Insua v. World Wide AIR, Inc., 582 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Aller v. Editorial Planeta, S.A., 389 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Paris Int'l Records & Filmworks, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 539 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)